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As the world recognizes Latin America’s footprint in the 21st century, the United 
States should rebalance priorities toward forming stronger relations with its neighbors in 
the Western Hemisphere.  U.S. relations with Latin America have become increasingly 
complex, as on the one hand, the United States is actively battling illegal immigration, 
gang violence, drug trafficking, and anti-democratic ideologies, and on the other hand, 
the United States is passively accepting China’s aggressive shift towards Latin America’s 
natural resources.  The purpose of this thesis is to identify how the United States should 
reassess relations with Latin America.  This thesis establishes solid reasoning that Latin 
America is gaining international momentum in the 21st century, through increasing 
natural resource trade, intensifying the transnational organized crime operations, and 
maintaining relations with terrorist organizations.  Globalization has permitted Latin 
America to slowly break away dependency from the United States and to form nascent 
relations with developing states. 
Collectively, all three chapters observe distinct characteristics within Latin 
America and identify whether U.S. interests are impacted, and if so, how the United 
States should respond.  The first chapter evaluates how a seemingly rogue state can affect 
a regional hegemony.  The case study chosen to examine this question was the 
relationship between Venezuela, under President Hugo Chavez, and the United 
States.  Currently, the United States is solely interested in Venezuela's oil.  Attempting to 
threaten U.S. economic, democratic and security interests, Chavez supported terrorist 
organizations, promoted anti-democratic ideologies, and directly supported anti-
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American endeavors.  Through examining Venezuela, this chapter determined the United 
States should decrease dependency on Venezuelan oil, as oil revenues gained are directly 
funneled back into Venezuela's corrupt leadership.  Additionally, the United States 
should continue intelligence assessment and monitoring on Venezuela's relationships 
with terrorist organizations and suspicious activities. 
The second chapter examines the effectiveness of U.S. military missions in 
Central America, primarily Honduras.  Through first understanding the history between 
the United States and Honduras, this chapter dissects three U.S. current operations in 
Honduras: 1) medical 2) mutual training 3) counter transnational organized crime.  
Honduras has become one of the most dangerous countries in the world, battling an 
increasing annual homicide rate, and infiltrated with drug trafficking, youth violence, and 
government corruption.  This chapter concludes that it is more cost beneficial for the U.S. 
military to reduce its presence in Honduras and to continue operations from stateside 
bases. 
Finally, the third chapter changes directions from the first two chapters by 
highlighting China’s recent attention in Latin America.  China’s booming economy and 
heavy industrialization has prompted China to tap into natural resources from around the 
globe, in order to maintain resource nationalism from within.  Latin America’s abundance 
in natural resources attracts Chinese investors and opens trade routes that did not 
previously exist.  China’s increased financial presence in the Western Hemisphere is 
healthy for Latin American economies, which presents a twofold reality for the United 
States.  Specifically, this makes for a more stable Latin America, thereby reducing 
migration and drug cartels and diminishing the current influx of socialist ideologies. 
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Within this thesis, each chapter focuses on a case study to examine how the 
United States should either reassess relations or respond to Latin America's evolution 
through globalization.  Ultimately, this paper will delve into how Latin American 
countries affect U.S. democratic, economic and security interests.  Through examining 
U.S.—Latin America relations and the influence of emerging markets in Latin America, 
the findings identify that the United States should not take a regional approach, but 
instead, consider each Latin American country independently.  Although intertwined with 
similar issues, each country faces internal challenges; the United States should ensure 
future policies pertaining to those specific issues take actions that will further U.S. 
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 The United States should rebalance priorities toward forming stronger 
relations with its Western Hemisphere neighbors.  Demonstrated throughout the history 
of the Western Hemisphere, an increasing transnational organized crime, emerging trade 
with China, and engagements with anti-American leaders, Central and South America 
directly impact the United States through political, economical, and military means.  As 
the nearest neighbor to the United States, Latin America remains and will remain an area 
of critical interest.   
 
Background – U.S. & Latin America 
Since the early 20th century when U.S. military units were dispatched to Panama, 
the United States established unified objectives in Latin America.  During World War II, 
the United States formed the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) headquarters, 
focusing on the Caribbean and Central and South America.  Throughout this paper, Latin 
America represents twenty sovereign states which cover an area that stretches from the 
southern border of the United States to the southern tip of South America, including the 
Caribbean.  Encompassing approximately one-sixth of the land mass of the world, it 
includes 31 countries and 15 areas of special sovereignty. 
Throughout the post-Vietnam military drawdown, political tensions heightened 
regarding U.S. engagement with Latin America.  From the 1940s to the 1980s, the United 
States supported nations who opposed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
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and built alliances to avoid further revolutions in Latin America.  The United States set 
out to reform economic structures and facilitate modernization, built anti-left unions to 
counter communist and socialist unions, supported military counterinsurgency and 
training.  Operations survived and into the 1980’s, internal conflicts with El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, and elsewhere rekindled U.S. military interests in Latin America.  
Throughout the years, U.S. interests in Latin America have undergone periods of 
dramatic change, where now U.S. military operations are focused on counter-drug 
operations and humanitarian missions.   
Brazil is now an emerging middle power in itself, with the seventh largest GNP in 
the world.
1
  Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico produce over 200 million barrels of oil per 
day.  Cuba, considered a power center in its own right, remains a communist nation.  
Moreover, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Bolivia during the Panama Canal 
negotiations, the Nicaraguan Revolution, and the 1979 Bolivian crisis have shown a 
capacity to play a concerted, distinctive and constructive role in hemispheric politics.
2
 
In a March 2014 Posture Statement to the House of Armed Services Committee, 
the USSOUTHCOM Commander stated, “While other global concerns dominate the 
headlines, we should not lose sight of either the challenges or opportunities closer to 
home.  In terms of geographic proximity, trade, culture, immigration, and the 
environment, no other part of the world has a greater impact on our daily life in our 
country than Latin America and the Caribbean.”
3
  Therefore, in efforts to support U.S. 
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natural security interests, foster security, stability and prosperity in the Americas, the 
United States maintains the following four priorities throughout the region: 1) economic 
growth, both for LAC and for U.S. competitiveness; 2) contingency response and 
humanitarian operations; 3) building partner – military capacity; 4) countering 
transnational organized crime. 
This thesis will show the United States should reassess relations with Latin 
America and become more responsive to human security concerns and intensify efforts to 
strengthen states across the Western Hemisphere.  This paradigmatic shift, which 
promotes U.S. interests, must include a far greater emphasis on multilateral approaches 
and U.S. public support.  
 
Case Selection & Thesis Logic 
Three case studies are performed throughout this thesis, where each study 
analyzes distinct characteristics within Latin America and identifies whether U.S. 
interests are impacted.  First, in order to show how a small rogue state can affect a 
regional hegemony, Venezuela was selected, under Hugo Chavez leadership, and the 
United States as a case study.  Chapter one will show how Chavez threatened U.S. 
economic, democratic and security interests by supporting terrorist organizations, 
promoting anti-democratic ideologies, and supporting anti-American endeavors.  Second, 
chapter two reviews U.S. military operations in Central America and chose operations 
executed in Honduras as the case study.  Specific operations are examined, in which the 
United States engages in Honduras and concluded which operations ultimately furthered 
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U.S. mission overall.  Lastly, chapter three identifies China’s 21st century quest in 
extracting natural resources from countries where trade relations were non-existent ten 
years prior.  Chapter three selects China’s emerging interest in Latin America’s natural 
resources and concludes how China’s growing presence in the Western Hemisphere 
affects the United States.  Jointly, all three case studies identify how U.S. interests are 
affected and whether the United States should respond.    
 
Chapter One – Venezuela  
Chapter one of this thesis seeks to evaluate the extent to which Chavez’s policies 
harmed U.S. interests and determine if the effects of the policies conformed to Chavez’s 
rhetoric.  First, the following research examines the conditions under which a small rogue 
state could affect a regional hegemon’s core interests.  This chapter explores whether 
small and weak states can affect regional stability.  Next, U.S. interests in Latin America 
are analyzed to determine if a regional state has the means and motivation to counter 
those interests, by examining the primary U.S. interests in Latin America that, if 
compromised, could jeopardize U.S. national security.  Further, a study of Venezuela is 
performed, focusing on the United States’ democratic, economic, and regional stability 
interests to interpret what future effect - if any - Venezuela posed to U.S. interests under 
dictator Hugo Chavez.  Ultimately, chapter one highlights how Hugo Chavez’s policies 
affected U.S. interests within Latin America. 
In efforts to counter drug trafficking, the United States seeks to prevent drug 
trafficking in destinations where drugs are destined for the United States.  According to 
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the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), traffickers are found transporting 
Colombian heroin, often via Venezuela, to Puerto Rico for onward shipment to Miami, 
New York, and Houston.  Not only are these smuggling routes used for solely drugs, but 
criminal networks move just about anything on these trafficking pipelines.  This 
represents a potential vulnerability that could be exploited by terrorist groups seeking to 
harm the United States.  Supporters and sympathizers of Lebanese Hezbollah are 
involved in both licit and illicit activities in Venezuela, including drug trafficking. 
Additionally, money, like drugs and people, has become mobile; it is easier to move than 
ever before, and the vast global illicit economy benefits both criminal and terrorist 
networks alike.  Clan-based, Lebanese Hezbollah- associated criminal networks exploit 
free trade zones and permissive areas in places like Venezuela. 
The United States maintains support for democracies in Latin America, and seeks 
to encourage reform of states that develop anti-democratic ideologies and policies. 
Chavez’s policies and posturing caused U.S. policy-makers to question his regard for 
democratic governance.  Chavez repressed Venezuelans’ rights and liberties, and 
unfortunately, his replacement, President Nicolas Maduro, continues in Chavez’s 
direction.  Within the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela’s political transformations do not 
directly affect U.S. democracy nor does it have a discernible effect throughout the region.  
Although Chavez influenced the region and Maduro continues to try to export socialist 
ideologies to neighboring countries, the United States remains optimistic that Latin 
America will ultimately reject the government of Venezuela’s rhetoric, as the majority of 
the Western Hemisphere aspires for free trade, democracy and citizen equality. 
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Furthermore, chapter one analyzes Venezuela’s dependency on oil sales from the 
United States.  Revenue generated from exporting oil to the United States was funneled 
back into Venezuela’s corrupt governance.  The United States continued importing oil 
from a country whose leadership publically defamed America’s values, principles and 
direction.  Close examination of Venezuela’s economic reforms lead to determining the 
United States should reconsider importing oil from Venezuela.  Moreover, Chavez’s 
partnership with Cuba and establishment of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americans 
(ALBA) displayed potential threats towards U.S. hegemony in Latin America. 
Lastly, chapter one evaluated Chavez’s teamwork with international leaders who 
had the capability to significantly negatively affect U.S. interests, such as Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  However, less direct threatening relationships 
included Cuban President Raul Castro and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  The 
potential national security threats Chavez posed to the United States were hypothetical 
and limited.  
 
Chapter Two – Honduras  
Chapter two of this thesis will discuss the efficacy of U.S. military missions in the 
key sub-region of Latin America, Central America, decisions can be made as to whether 
to continue, cancel, or alter U.S. policy in the region.  The United States has adopted a 
strategy using interagency coordination to approach regional issues of security and 
stability.  Chapter two examines whether U.S. presence in Central America, using 
Honduras as the case study, strengthens implementation of the U.S. Southern Command 
Strategy in accordance with the U.S. National Security Strategy.  First, the chapter 
7 
 
studies the U.S.–Central America relationship and identifies the importance of 
strengthening a regional security strategy.  The chapter then goes on to detail the 
transnational organized crime and drug-related challenges in Central America by 
discussing whether the region poses a significant threat to U.S. national and international 
security.   
Further, chapter two explains why Honduras became a vital ally for the United 
States since the 1980s and specifically Honduras’ strategic function within Central 
America.  Lastly, the chapter will address whether there have been improvements in 
Honduras due to current U.S. operations in-country as well as explore how U.S. resources 
in Honduras contribute to Central America’s overall regional stability. 
After analyzing U.S. military operations in Honduras, findings determined the 
efficient use of resources, especially during an era of austerity budgets for the United 
States, the military’s decision to remain postured in Honduras must be reevaluated.  
Counter transnational organized crime efforts can continue to remain aligned with 
counterterrorism objectives without being physically based in Honduras.  The United 
States can still maintain vigilance in monitoring and guarding against an opportunistic or 
growing nexus between foreign terrorist organizations and transnational organized 
criminal without a heavy U.S. military presence in Honduras.  
 
Chapter Three – China & Latin America 
Changing directions from the previous chapters, the third chapter of this thesis 
delves into China’s recent obsession with Latin America’s natural resources.  Chapter 
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three seeks to evaluate how the United States should respond to China’s aggressive 
achievements towards becoming a developed nation by expanding into Latin America’s 
doorstep.  Chinese engagement in Latin America is focused primarily on economics, but 
it uses all elements of national power to achieve its goals.  Major investments include 
potentially $40 billion to construct an alternative to the Panama Canal in Nicaragua and 
$3 billion to Costa Rica and Caribbean nations for myriad infrastructure and social 
development projects.  China is the single biggest source of financing to Venezuela and 
Ecuador, due to China's thirst for natural resources and contracts for Chinese state-owned 
companies.  Chinese companies hold notable investments in at least five major ports and 
are major vendors of telecommunications services to 18 nations in the region.  In the 
defense realm, Chinese technology companies are partnering with Venezuela, Brazil, and 
Bolivia to launch imagery and communications satellites.  Additionally, China is 
gradually increasing its military outreach, offering educational exchanges with many 
regional militaries.  In 2013, the Chinese Navy conducted a goodwill visit in Brazil, 
Chile, and Argentina and conducted its first-ever naval exercise with the Argentine Navy. 
Furthermore, Chinese arms sales to regional militaries have more than quadrupled since 
2010, while the frequency of high-level Chinese visits have also increased substantially.  
Although China’s strategy with engaging relations with Latin America is centered on 
natural resources, the United States should maintain vigilance with China’s increased 
engagements in the military realm.  
 Chapter three will examine why China has targeted natural resources in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the way in which China’s raw material scarcity, 
combined with a rampant population and industrial growth, is of grave concern to 
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China’s populace and countries relying on products produced in China.  By exploring the 
dominant LAC countries exporting natural resources to China and analyzing how the 
future of the commodities will yield fruits of growth for these countries, the United States 
will be in a position to assist China’s quest in LAC or stand aside.  Ultimately, this 
chapter will highlight how LAC’s natural resource endowments are vital to its economic 
growth and its economic relationship with China. 
Through researching China’s natural resource going-out strategy in Latin 
America, it was concluded the health of Latin America’s natural resources is as important 
for the United States as it is for China.  However, where China and the United States 
differ is due to inherent geography.  The United States should enhance trade with LAC, 
in order to secure more job security in Latin America.  The United States and Latin 
America share the Western Hemisphere and have other mutual interests besides 
economic trade alone.  Specifically, the United States must ensure that security, 
immigration and trade do not threaten U.S. national security interests.  By increasing 
trade with LAC and enabling job security, it is likely less Latin Americans will illegally 
migrate to the United States and probable that transnational organized crime will reduce.   
 
Conclusion 
Each chapter within this thesis discusses how Latin America’s future affects U.S. 
interests towards developing a stronger economy, maintaining regional security, and 
sustaining democratic policies.  Latin American countries are largely at peace with one 
another and with the United States, therefore, conventional military threats from the 
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region remain low.  However, nations throughout the hemisphere are contending with 
asymmetric threats to national and international security.  Chapter one shows a positive 
and open relationship between Venezuela and the United States would have mutually 
benefited both countries; however, Venezuela’s leadership chose to attack, verbally and 
through anti-American ideologies, the United States.  Therefore, the United States should 
remain watchful for the potential impact of activities of violent extremist organizations 
and implications of the activities of nations, such as Iran, within the region.  Chapter two 
identifies that Honduras continues illegal trafficking and transnational organized crime, 
which directly results in an instable Central America.  Finally, chapter three explores 
China’s sought interest in Latin America’s natural resources and delivers hope that a 
developing nation recognizes Latin America’s potential and has decided to take risk by 


















Nestled in the northern point of South America and bordered by Colombia, Brazil, 
Guyana, the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, Venezuela is a strategically located 
and highly influential Latin American country with a leading petroleum industry.  From 
1999 to 2013, Venezuela was ruled by the socialist-leaning and anti-American President, 
Hugo Chavez.  As the world’s eleventh-largest oil producer, Venezuela is also the fourth-
largest supplier of oil to the United States.
4
  Capable of fixing oil costs to inflate fuel 
prices for Americans, Chavez used influence to increase U.S. dependency on Venezuela.  
Also, Chavez directly violated United States and NATO demands ranging from human 
rights violations to supporting countries sanctioned by the United States, such as Syria 
and Iran.
5
  In fact, Chavez developed and maintained a close relationship with former 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when tensions were escalated between the 
United States and Iran. 
Venezuela became the primary entry point to the Western Hemisphere as anti-
American countries expanded footprints into the region.  This chapter argues that 
Venezuela, under Chavez’s leadership, affected the United States by strategically 
increasing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, where gained revenues directly funded 
government corruption.  By 2013, Venezuela possessed more modernized weapon 
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 Top World Oil Producers, 2010. Independent Statistics and Analysis.  UNITED STATES Energy 
Information Administration. 
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 Johnson, Keith and Solomon, Jay. “To Power Syria, Chavez Send Diesel.” The Wall Street Journal. July 
9, 2012.  
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systems than any other country in Latin America.
6
  Furthermore, Chavez vocalized his 
opposition towards the United States.  Specifically, when welcoming Ahmadinejad to 
Venezuela in 2007, Chavez called for “an anti-imperialist military alliance against U.S. 
dominance…The enemy is the same: the empire of the U.S…Anyone who messes with 
one of us will have to mess with all of us, because we will respond as one.
7
  After U.S. 
diplomats were murdered in the Benghazi, Libya attack on September 12, 2012, the 
Venezuelan foreign minister was quick to blame the attack on “colonialist aggression” 
and demanded an “end to interventionism and campaigns of hatred against Arab and 
Muslim peoples.”
8
  These characteristics raised concerns whether Chavez’s actions were 
to maximize Venezuela’s security and profit or whether they were intended to be hostile 
toward the United States.   
This paper seeks to evaluate the extent to which Chavez’s policies harmed U.S. 
interests and determine if the effects of the policies conformed to Chavez’s rhetoric.  
First, the following research examines the conditions under which a small rogue state can 
affect a regional hegemon’s core interests.  This chapter explores whether small and weak 
states affected regional stability.  Next, U.S. interests in Latin America are analyzed to 
determine if a regional state had the means and motivation to counter those interests, by 
examining the primary U.S. interests in Latin America which, if compromised, 
jeopardized U.S. national security.  Further, a study of Venezuela is performed, focusing 
on the United States’ democratic, economic, and regional stability interests to interpret 
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 Rowan, Michael and Schoen, Douglas. “Hugo Chavez and the War Against America: The Threat Closer 
to Home.” Free Press. January 2009. p12. 
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8
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Foundation. No. 3740. September 24, 2012. 
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what future effect – if any – Venezuela posed to U.S. interests.  Ultimately, this chapter 
will highlight how Hugo Chavez’s policies affected U.S. interests within Latin America. 
 
How Small Rogue States Can Affect Stability 
In order to determine whether the United States should alter its foreign policy or 
utilize resources to counter small rogue states opposing U.S. interests, one must first 
define a rogue state, and second examine if small states can in fact affect regional 
stability, which is usually produced by some form of regional hegemony.   
First, the traditional definition of a rogue state pertains to violations of state 
sovereignty.  Article 2 of the United Nations charter stipulates that all member nations 
shall “refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
9
  Previous U. S. 
administrations have defined rogue states by the pursuit of WMD, the use of terrorism as 
an instrument of state policy, and constitution of a regional threat to important U.S. 
interests.  For example, former President Bush viewed a rogue state as the chief threat to 
global order, and his foreign policies aimed either to alter the behavior of rogue states, or 
eliminate those regimes that refused to play by his rules.  Robert Litwak, in his book 
Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy, stated that rogue states are derived from realist 
criteria relating to external behaviors, versus their domestic policies.  Litwak argued that 
each U.S. policy should be dependent on the target state, versus a one-size-fits-all 
approach to rogue states.  He believed the following factors should be used to access 
target state behavior across domestic, regional, and international levels of analysis: the 
                                                          




target state’s historical background, the character of the regime and its leadership, the 
regime’s declaratory policy and ideology, its recent foreign policy behavior, the 
international environment within which the target state exists, and the domestic context 
within the target state and the potential for a favorable political evolution.  Over the 
years, the definition of rogue has become increasingly muddled.  For these reasons, this 
paper defined Venezuela as small rogue stated based on Litwak’s factors.. 
Second, the United States, since the Monroe Doctrine, has been the primary 
regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere.  Although the past three decades have 
seen the ascendency of smaller regional hegemons, such as Brazil, U.S, economic and 
military might continues to dominate in the Western Hemisphere.
10
  
Some scholars argue that hegemonic states cannot lead unless smaller and weaker 
states follow.
11
  In fact, small and weak states “balance against the powerful states and 
pursue compromise strategies such as binding the leading state to regional and global 
institutions.”
12
  In other words, a state becomes or remains the hegemonic power based 
on the governmental and economic developments of neighboring regional states.  For 
example Russia remains the greatest economic and military power in the region because 
of the former Soviet Republics or Eastern European satellite states.
13
  Specifically, 
Estonia and Ukraine balance against Russia, and Kazakhstan balances with Russia, for 
the following reasons: Estonia has the weakest economic and military power yet is a 
liberal nationalist democracy; Ukraine has a strong economic and military power, 
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11
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however, the government borders from being liberal nationalist democracy to neo-
communist depending on what ideological type of leader is in power; Kazakhstan is a 
neo-communist authoritarian regime that bandwagons with Russia.
14
  Moreover, Russia’s 
close proximity and relationship with China’s has lead to increased economic and 
military power, due to aligning regional security interests.  Russia’s hegemony in the 
region is directly related to the balancing against neighboring states, such as Estonia and 
Ukraine, and bandwagoning, such as Kazakhstan and China. 
Other scholars have established that “states prefer to balance rather than 
bandwagon,” meaning a state has more power through an alliance of other states, rather 
than following the regional hegemon.
15
  Alliances can be powerful and effective whether 
or not members are located in the same region.  Due to globalization and technological 
advances, states can strategically align with other nations regardless of geographic 
separation.  Within Latin America, the United States experienced opposition from 
Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973; however, those countries acting alone were 
powerless to resist U.S. dominance.
16
  On the other hand, Cuba and Argentina were 
successful at resisting the U.S. hegemon with support from Brazil and the Soviet Union 
during the 1960s.
17
  Although the United States attempted to counter such resistance, at 
least in the case of Cuba, its efforts were unsuccessful, due in large part to Cuba’s 
alliance with the former Soviet Bloc.  Soviet assistance to Cuba through trade and 
military investment ultimately resulted in the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Western 
Hemisphere, within miles from the U.S. border.  
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There are numerous other examples of regional hegemony.  For example, in East 
Asia, China is the undoubted regional hegemon.
18
  Such hegemony can either be 
strengthened or weakened by the smaller states within the region, such as Japan, and 
Taiwan.  Japan and Taiwan usually act as counter-weights in balancing U.S. regional 
interests in East Asia against those of China.
19
  Taiwan individually may not threaten 
China; however, Japan’s partnership with Taiwan could weaken China’s hegemonic 
power in East Asia.  China is the hegemon because of trade, investment, and educational 
ties with the United States, European Union, Japan and Taiwan, all of which are 
governed by liberal democratic orders.  China cannot afford to take an aggressive stance 
against a liberal democratic order or jeopardize the trade and investment these countries 
provide.  In addition, Japan provides a military home for the United States in Asia and 
aids to the U.S. economy by maintaining the United States as their number one trading 
partner.  Moreover, both Japan and Taiwan have an advanced military, which is 
important because this provides the ability to guard economic resources, such as 
controlling raw materials, protecting sources of capital, and insuring a competitive 
advantage in the production of highly valued goods. 
20
 
The United States is determined to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and secure 
nuclear arsenal.  As the top priority for U.S. national security, President Obama stated, 
“there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, 
particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremist.”
21
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Since the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone by the 1967 Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have built seven nuclear power plants, with 
Venezuela starting to explore the possible development of a nuclear energy program of 
its own.
22
  Several Latin American countries are developing militarily, economically, and 
technologically, which may lead to a nuclear country within the region.  Although Latin 
America remains a nuclear weapons free region, countries, such as Brazil and Venezuela, 
have recently increased uranium enrichment.  Should small states, such as Venezuela, 
Cuba, and Ecuador combine resources with more powerful states, such as Mexico and 
Brazil, to acquire nuclear weapons, they could attempt to balance against the regional 
hegemon.   
 
Latin American Interests 
 Within the Western Hemisphere, the United States has taken measures, although 
discreet, to ensure national security.  In 1962, President John F. Kennedy was the first 
and only U.S. president to enter into hostile negotiations against a state prepared to use 
nuclear weapons against the United States, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Nikita 
Khrushchev and Fidel Castro both shared communist ideologies and were defiant against 
the United States.  Using Cuba’s proximity to the United States, the Soviet Union was 
capable of firing nuclear missiles with a range of one thousand miles.
23
  The Cuban 
Missile Crisis marked a period where the United States was quickly forced to accept the 
importance in ensuring security within the Western Hemisphere.  
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The Iran-Contra Affair is another event where the United States encountered 
troubles with their Western neighbors.  In 1980, President Ronald Reagan was faced with 
American-hostages and the cruel torturing of a CIA agent by terrorists.  Simultaneously 
battling Communists in Central America, particularly the Sandanistas in Nicaragua, 
Reagan tried to rebuild relations with Iran by overcoming the American hostage crisis.  
Reagan secretly sold American arms to Iran and diverted the profits to the Contras in 
Nicaragua, which became Nicaragua’s primary source of funding for six years.
24
  
Overthrowing the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the United States invested resources and 
jeopardized integrity to maintain stability in Latin America.   
U.S. interests in Latin America extend into present-day examples as well.  The 
United States’ primary concern regarding Latin America today encompasses a variety of 
criminal enterprises, including narcotic trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, 
human trafficking, kidnapping, and arms and counterfeit goods smuggling, as well as 
rooting out extremist groups such as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's 
Army (FARC).
25
  Over the past ten years, the United States has spent billions of dollars 
and contributed training and military resources to combat drug trafficking in the region.  
Although U.S. interests in Latin America have evolved over time, the United States 
continues to serve as the region’s hegemony.  
 
Democratic Interests in Latin America 
 The United States uses diplomatic efforts to advance democracy through 
international relations.  Expounding on human rights, citizen’s freedom, and fair 
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elections, the United States seeks to maintain a democratic Latin America.  However, one 
exception stands since 1965: Cuba has remained a communist state and continues to be 
labeled a U.S. adversary.   
According to the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama 
remarked, “through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and 
commensurate resources, we can strengthen regional partners to advance democracy.”
26
  
Therefore, the United States maintains support for democracies in Latin America, and 
seeks to encourage reform of states that develop anti-democratic ideologies and policies. 
Since the 1970s, many Latin American countries have worked to establish and strengthen 
democratic systems and develop fledgling economies.
27
 However in many Latin 
American countries the state controls only part of the territory, such as in Colombia and 
Guyana.
28
 In such countries, armed groups or indigenous peoples effectively control large 
swaths of territory.  
President Kennedy, recognizing it essential for the Americas to adopt democracy 
and free markets, took a stand against the Soviet Union and Cuba in the 1960s to deter 
communism.  In the 1980s, Henry Kissinger and Ronald Reagan actively supported a 
democratic Latin America by structuring foreign policy and foreign aid around 
establishing freedom and democracy.  In fact, during a presidential address to the United 
States in 1984, Reagan declared, “Central America is a region of great importance to the 
United States.  And it is so close: San Salvador is close to Houston, Texas, than Houston 
is to Washington, DC.  Central America is America.  It’s at our doorstep…we can and we 
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must help Central America.  It’s in our national interest to do so, and morally it’s the only 
right thing to do.”
29
  In eight years, the Reagan administration delivered $3.2 billion in 
economic and military aid to Central America.
30
  Initially focusing on El Salvador, the 
Reagan administration attempted to instill a stable democracy; however, El Salvador 
became completely dependent on U.S. aid, rather than developing a healthy government 
or economy.  Eventually, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras adopted a 
democratic system, although certain scholars ascertain those countries remained a 
“totalitarian dungeon” rather than resembling a democratic nation.
31
  During the 2012 
Nicaraguan elections, the media forecasted the event to be the last time citizens will be 
able to elect their authorities, if President Daniel Ortega continues to promote the process 
of electoral “Cubanization.”
32
  Nevertheless, Central America has remained a democratic 
region, and although it has been a sluggish process, the region has reduced bloodshed and 
political conflict by instilling citizen rights and strengthening their democratic systems.   
One area targeted for reform is pervasive and crippling corruption, which prevails 
in several Latin American countries.  Poverty, crime, drug cartels and overall corruption 
continues to plague Central America, specifically Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.  
As the United States continues to engage with Latin America, diplomatic and political 
leaders promote true democracy carefully.  It is essential for the United States to support 
a democratic Western Hemisphere without dictating specific policies and agendas only to 
benefit U.S. interests.  A strengthened democratic Latin America bolsters U.S. national 
security. 
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Economic Interests in Latin America 
Generally, the United States seeks to capitalize on its resources to grow the U.S. 
economy and ultimately reduce trade imbalances with other countries.  U.S. economic 
interests are relatively similar in Latin America as in the rest of the world.  In fact, 
President Obama remarked in his national security strategy speech, “America is 
dependent upon overseas markets to sell its exports and maintain access to scarce 
commodities and resources,”
33
 specifically promising to “integrate markets in the 
Americas, advance economic inclusion, and promote clean energy.”
34
 
 First, the United States is the world’s largest oil consuming country, importing 30 
percent of its oil from Latin America.
35
  The U.S. dependency on Latin America’s oil is 
crucial for maintaining steady oil prices for Americans.  Latin America contains four of 
the top fifteen countries that export crude oil to the United States: Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Ecuador.
36
  Since the 1990s, oil production has increased by almost 50 
percent in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.  The 
Middle East maintains the largest amount of remaining oil reserves in the world, at 
roughly 820 billion barrels, yet annual crude oil imports are about the same between 
Mexico and Saudi Arabia.
37
  Strengthening partnerships with Latin American countries is 
critical in order for the United States to minimize its cost of importing oil. 
 By pursing trade liberalization, the United States has implemented comprehensive 
bilateral trade agreements within Latin American countries, which has bolstered the U.S. 
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economy as well as Latin American economies.  These include the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with 
Chile and Peru.
38
  Additionally, Latin America is the largest U.S. regional trade partner 
and has made progress in “trade liberalization, reducing tariffs significantly and entering 
into their own regional agreements.”
39
  As the fastest growing regional trade partner with 
the United States, Latin America’s economy depends heavily on both U.S. imports and 
exports. 
 
Security Interests in Latin America 
 In order to ensure a stable and secure United States, its interests in Latin America 
entail: dismantling transnational threats, such as terrorism, international criminal cartels, 
and continuing counter-narcotic missions.  Recent interests in transnational threats are 
based off the premise that the Western Hemisphere may serve as a harbor for terrorist 
organizations. 
As terrorists expand their borders and non-state actors advance strategically, the 
United States must be adequately equipped to defend its borders and protect the 
American people.  Specifically, securing a 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border, the United 
States is continuously engaged in combating trafficked narcotics, human trafficking, and 
illegal immigration.   An insecure U.S.-Mexico border could provide access for terrorists 
into the United States.  In addition, U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico and the British 
Virgin Islands, could create entry points into the United States for radical extremists. The 
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United States remains focused to deterring states to provide terrorist safe havens, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Finally, the United States leads the Drug War effort by aiming to reduce illegal 
narcotics imported into the United States.  From partnering with Colombia to fight the 
FARC, to orchestrating U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Department of 
Defense (DOD) missions throughout Central America, the United States is determined to 
continue the war on drugs and illicit trafficking throughout the Western Hemisphere.     
 
CASE STUDY:  Venezuela and Hugo Chavez 
 At the age of seventeen, Hugo Chavez was recruited into the Venezuelan 
Academy of Military Sciences where he graduated as a second lieutenant in 1975.
40
  
Chavez was mentored by leftist leaders, such a Douglas Bravo,
41
 until he was transferred 
in 1979 to teach at his former military academy.
42
 As a Lieutenant Colonel in 1992, he 
led a coup to overthrow former President Carlos Andres Perez.  Although, failing to 
successfully overthrow Perez, Chavez was broadcasted reciting the military surrender 
speech, which academics believe to have contributed to his presidential victory in 1999.
43
  
Reelected a second presidential term in 2001, this period is theorized as the moment 
where tensions between Chavez and the United States began to get worse.  Moreover, 
Chavez blames the United States for the orchestrated coup attempt in 2002, in which 
Chavez believes the Central Intelligence Agency was plotting to assassinate him. 
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 Under the Chavez Administration, Venezuela had a weak and volatile external 
economic environment.  Chavez increased the role of the state in the economy, limiting 
the reforms causing Venezuela’s business environment “the least friendly in the world.”
44
 
Chavez lead the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).  Following his reelection in 
2010, Chavez appointed nine PSUV loyalists to the Supreme Court.
45
  Additionally, the 
PSUV passed laws “aimed at creating a communal state and economy; limiting internal 
rules for assembly debate; prohibiting party defections; increasing government control 
over the independent media, Internet, banks, and non-governmental organizations; and 





Chavez’s Impact on Democracy 
 On October 7, 2012, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez was re-elected to 
another six-year term, his third such term in a row.  Using the ballot system to cast votes, 
Chavez won Venezuela’s presidency with 54.42 percent, or 7.4 million votes.
47
  For 
many, this election was viewed as a victory for the democratic system in Latin America.  
In a contemporary world, liberal democracy is regarded as a government structure where 
the majority of people express their rights through free and fair elections.
48
  This also 
requires checks and balances for government authorities by a constitution, which protects 
the rights of society’s majority and minorities. 
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 Chavez’s second term in office (2007-2013) revealed his plan to radicalize and 
reformulate the Bolivarian project into “twenty-first-century socialism.”
49
 Chavez led the 
effort in transforming Venezuelan democracy from liberal to participatory, with an 
emphasis of more citizen participation.
50
  Essentially, this was implemented by 
developing a vast network of community councils formed by spokespersons of 
community-based organizations.  This reorganization of local politics directly involved 
the Venezuelan people, which weakened the local government and representation.  This 
led to communities being overrun by one or two people and corruption of resources.  In 
theory, once the Venezuelan government allocated resources for a community, it was up 
to that council leader to appropriate the funds.    
   Furthermore, Chavez passed 26 presidential decrees that allowed him to appoint 
regional leaders with budgetary powers in areas such as tourism, railways, social security 
and financial institutions.
51
  Additionally, the new constitution had an unlimited term 
limit for elected officials, including the president.  Most aggravating to the United States 
was Chavez’s nationalization of Venezuela’s oil industry. 
Human Rights Watch reported that Chavez’s political operatives threatened over 240 
radio stations with license revocation if they “harmed the interests of the state, caused 
panic, or disturbed social justice,” which led to thirteen stations shutting down.
52
  
Moreover, Chavez fired employees from government agencies who were deemed part of 
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  Although projecting himself as a democratic leader in Latin 
America, Chavez worked to undermine Venezuelans’ fundamental right to democratic 
participation in their political system. 
 According to congressional records, the U.S. government provided approximately 
$5 million to Venezuela annually for democracy related assistance.
54
  Policy makers and 
activists were engaged to ensure Venezuela observes democratic norms.  A conference in 
2011 entitled “Legitimacy Lost: How 21st Century Socialism Subverts Democracy in 
Latin America” was sponsored by think tanks and policy makers.
55
  Primarily focused on 
Venezuelan policy, the conference discussed how Chavez planned to subvert democracy 
and cement autocratic power.  The United States feared that Chavez was working to 
dismantle Venezuelan democracy by allying with anti-U.S. regimes and neglecting 
nations partnered with the United States, such as Colombia.  
 Chavez’s policies and posturing caused U.S. policy-makers to question his regard 
for democratic governance.  Within the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela’s political 
transformations did not directly affect U.S. democracy nor did it have a discernible effect 
throughout the region.  Although Chavez did influence the region and tried to export his 
socialist ideology to neighboring countries, the United States remained optimistic that 
Latin America would ultimately reject his rhetoric, as the majority of the Western 
Hemisphere aspired for free trade, democracy, and citizen equality.     
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Chavez’s Impact on the U.S. Economy 
Venezuela’s Oil 
Oil was Chavez’s most powerful weapon.  As a major supplier of foreign oil to 
the United States, Venezuelan oil accounted for nearly 11 percent of U.S. consumption.
56
  
Moreover, Venezuela was the third largest supplier of oil products to the United States, 
exporting approximately 1 million barrels (equivalent to $117 million) per day of crude 
oil and products to the United States.
57
  Venezuela exported 40 percent of their oil to the 
United States annually.
58
   
Since 2001, the United States was primarily focused on Middle Eastern affairs 
and reducing dependence on its oil.  U.S. concern was largely based on volatile oil prices 
caused by instability in that region.  In reality, Chavez was just as much to blame for 
volatile oil prices, given his failure to invest in Venezuela’s flagging oil infrastructure 
and international concern about instability within Venezuela itself.  For example, since 
Chavez became president, Venezuelan oil output fell 25 percent.
59
  Based on analyzing 
headlines, this chapter concluded the U.S. media and politicians did not openly discuss 
the oil exported from Latin America, specifically Venezuela, as frequently as oil from 
other parts of the world.   
Upon becoming President 1999, Chavez revised Venezuela’s constitution and 
consolidated his executive powers.  Notably, in 2002, Chavez took control of the national 
oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).  Frustrated by the increased 
governmental executive control, PDVSA management and employees orchestrated a two-
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day walkout and formed protests, which resulted in the death of eighteen Venezuelans.  
Chavez later fired 18,000 employees and replaced them with military and political 
loyalists, many who were completely unskilled in the oil business.
60
  Outraged by 
Chavez’s demands to turn over oil exploration and production property rights to 
Venezuela, American companies ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips immediately 
abandoned operations in Venezuela.  Coincidently, the PDVSA president was also the 
Minister of Energy and Petroleum, which was essentially a conflict of interest as he was 
responsible for both managing and monitoring PDVSA.
61
   
Venezuela’s oil reserves were second only to Saudi Arabia.  However, unlike 
Saudi Arabia’s oil, which was light, cheap and easy to refine, 90 percent of Venezuela’s 
oil was heavy, expensive, and difficult to refine.
62
  The United States was the primary 
country equipped to refine Venezuela’s crude oil, requiring an extensive amount of 
technology and investment to process.  These refinement activities provided numerous 
employment opportunities for Americans.  Although the United States benefited from the 
oil refining process, the long-term effects of relying on Venezuela’s oil were negative.  
Imported oil affected the purchasing power of U.S. currency, attainability of reasonable 
credit, and the amount of jobs created or lost.  While the United States represented only 
four percent of the world’s population, Americans consumed over one quarter of the 
world’s oil.
63
  The price of imported oil affected more than raised prices at the pump: 
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there was an increased cost for most plastics, transporting goods and food items, and the 
cost of operating gas-powered machinery. 
U.S. dependency on oil, in turn, generated reliance and vulnerability towards 
those countries supplying the oil.  In 2011, the following statement was noted during a 
112th congressional committee hearing on natural resources, “Oil and natural gas are still 
going to be a part of our energy mix for a long time to come and we must be able to 
access our own resources, rather than becoming more dependent on unstable parts of the 
world.”
64
  Specifically referring to Venezuela, the resolution noted, “U.S. money is going 
overseas for oil, much to countries hostile to us.”
65
  In essence, Venezuela depended on 
the United States almost as much as the United States relied on Venezuela.  In fact, oil 
and natural gas supplied approximately 60 percent of the U.S. natural energy needs, 
including 99 percent of the fuel used by Americans in their vehicles alone.
66
  Oil 
dependence on corrupt autocracies – like Venezuela – placed the United States in a 
conflicting situation between supporting energy interests and defending its traditional 
values.  
As a founding member of OPEC, Chavez urged OPEC to abandon the U.S. dollar 
as its international currency.  For example, in 2003, former Venezuelan Energy & Mines 
Minister requested that OPEC discard the U.S. dollar as a trading currency and to adopt 
the Euro to compensate for the U.S. dollar’s plummeting international value.
67
  Chavez 
obtained a powerful position globally almost solely due to Venezuela’s oil resources.  
Had Chavez decided to cut off oil supply to the United States, Americans would have 
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been negatively affected.  The United States would have increased oil imports from other 
countries, driving the costs higher to transport oil from further away.  The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office reported “that any move to completely replace oil 
from Venezuela with fuel from other suppliers would take several years and would 
require a significant increase in production capacity elsewhere in the world.”
68
   
Conversely, Chavez understood that losing the United States as an oil consumer would 
have significantly damaged Venezuela’s economy.  Therefore, it was highly unlikely he 
would have risked cutting off oil exports to the United States.  China, however, could 
have potentially replaced the United States in consuming Venezuelan oil.  Already, China 
invested in Venezuela’s oil infrastructure and considered the purchase of two new oil 
fields in Venezuela; however, due to the distance of transporting the oil, the shortage of 
refining capabilities, and the increased expenses were estimated to result in a net loss for 
Venezuela.
69
    
 
Venezuela’s Alliance with Cuba 
Latin American scholars claimed that Cuba’s former president Fidel Castro 
molded Chavez from his early years to follow and implement his socialist ideologies.  
Cuba was one of the four countries on the U.S. State Department’s State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list.  Cuba supported various terrorist and revolutionary movements in the 
Western Hemisphere.
70
  Since Castro stepped down as President in 2008 and as leader of 
Cuba’s Communist Party in 2011, Cuba neglected to demonstrate a fundamental change 
                                                          
68
 Lapper, Richard. “Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.” Council on 
Foreign Relations Special Report. November, 2006. p24.  
69
 Ibid. p25.  
70
 “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity.” 112th Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on National Security 
Homeland Defense and Foreign Relations. Serial No. 112-71. Serial No. 112-79. June 24, 2011. p45.  
31 
 
in leadership nor did Cuba cease supporting international terrorism.  Moreover, the 
United States could not validate that Cuba had gone six months without supporting 
foreign terrorist organizations or provide assurance that Cuba would stop supporting 
international terrorism in the future.  Particularly troublesome to the United States was 
Cuba’s relationship with the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN).
71
  Both FARC 
and the ELN were U.S. designated foreign terrorist organizations in accordance with 
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
72
  On October 31, 2012, the FARC 
claimed responsibility for detonating a suitcase bomb near a town square in Colombia, 
where 5,000 children were celebrating Halloween, harming 37 people.
73
  FARC 
continues be a threat in the Western Hemisphere.  In addition, Cuba harbored a member 
on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted list, who was wanted for 
murdering a U.S. state police officer, deemed as a politically motivated act of terrorism.
74
 
Castro acted as a mentor to Chavez, most notably since Chavez attempted to 
overthrow the Venezuelan government in 1982.  Chavez was publically recorded 
vocalizing his admiration for Castro, exclaiming:  
“You are the one with an exceptional mind, not me”; “We follow your example”; “Yes 
Fidel. I have become, well, you have turned me into an emissary, a source”; “But you, 
Cuba and its example of dignity, of battle, courage and its infinite solidarity has always 
and will always be with us as an example”; “I do not have any qualms about calling you 
‘father’ in front of the world. Onward to victory”; “In those days [1989] I saw you from 
afar and I wanted to get close to greet you, but I could not, but we were already involved 




                                                          
71
 “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activity.” 112th Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on National Security 
Homeland Defense and Foreign Relations. Serial No. 112-71. Serial No. 112-79. June 24, 2011. p45.  
72
 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. September 28, 2012.  
73
 Garcia, Cesar. “2 Killed, 37 Injured in Colombia Blast.” Associated Press. November 1, 2012.  
74
 “Wanted by the FBI.” The FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
75
 Schoen, Douglas and Rowan, Michael. “The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chavez and the War Against 
America.” Free Press. January, 2009. p81 
32 
 
 Chavez provided Cuba approximately $2 billion in subsidized oil a year and 
100,000 barrels of oil a day, which was discounted as much as 40 percent.
76
  In return, 
Cuba offered an export market to Venezuela of doctors and technical advisors as 
Venezuela’s health care system was not as advanced neither technologically nor 
medically skilled as Cuba’s.
77
  Venezuela was Cuba’s largest trading partner, amounting 
to roughly $7 billion per year.
78
  On the one hand, Venezuela’s increased trade with Cuba 
countered the United States’ trade embargo against Cuba.  On the other hand, this 
relationship did not weaken the U.S. economy.  In fact, U.S. economists and politicians 
debated whether the United States should readjust embargos and restrictions against 
Cuba.  Regardless of the controversial U.S.–Cuban relationship, Chavez demonstrated he 
would partner with whomever he wished, despite agitating the United States.         
 
Chavez’s Regional Trading Partnerships 
The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americans (ALBA) was established in 2004 
and functioned as a political alliance that facilitated economic assistance between 
Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and three Caribbean countries.  ALBA 
was intended to contest U.S. hegemony in Latin America.  In 2010, with ALBA 
partnerships, Chavez was finally successful at conducting the first bilateral trade deal 
with Ecuador using the new, ALBA adopted, trading currency: the Unitary System of 
Regional Compensation (Sucre).
79
  Had the Sucre became a serious currency, trading 
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goods with the Sucre, rather than the U.S. dollar, would have threatened U.S. trade 
interests in the region, causing the U.S. dollar to decrease in value.  After the transaction 
using the Sucre, Chavez proclaimed, “the implementation of the Sucre allows us to 
advance towards freeing ourselves from the dollar, decoupling ourselves from the 
international hegemonic system.”
80
  Chavez was slowly implementing his vision of to 
break away from the region’s hegemon.    
After Cuba, Chavez’s closest ally in the region was Bolivia.  Chavez had an 
exceptionally close relationship with Bolivian President Evo Morales, who received $1 
billion in aid from Venezuela after taking office in 2006.
81
  Morales allowed Chavez’s 
PDVSA access to Bolivia’s natural gas reserves, nationalized the gas industry and kicked 
out private sector multinational energy companies.
82
  Upon taking office, Morales 
attacked U.S. policies and endorsed the Peoples Trade Treaty, which swapped 200,000 
barrels a month of subsidized Venezuelan diesel fuel for Bolivian soya.
83
  The 
relationship between Venezuela and Bolivia was viewed by scholars as a regional 
partnership to strengthen economies and promote sustainable development.  However, in 
2008 when Morales expelled the U.S. Ambassador, kicked out all Peace Corps 
volunteers, and forced the Drug Enforcement Administration out of Bolivia, it became 
apparent that ALBA’s mission was more than merely economic integration.  As 
evidenced in the Bolivian example, Chavez influenced states to wean themselves from 
using the U.S. dollar and to decrease the U.S. political footprint in the region. 
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Free trade had arguably prevailed to level economic inequality throughout the 
world, including in Latin America.  Policy makers lobbied hard to pass FTAs in Latin 
American, securing NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and bilateral agreements with Chile and Peru.  
Chavez was on a mission to attack U.S. trade inroads by providing subsidized oil and 
cheap goods as well as debt relief assistance throughout Latin America.
84
   
Since the 1990s, U.S. administrations have relied on the Summit of the Americas 
to annually meet with heads of state and government of the Western Hemisphere to 
discuss common political issues, affirm shared values, and address shared challenges in 
the Americas.
85
  Leaders of North America, Central America, the Caribbean, and South 
America are invited to the annual summit, except Cuba.  Members of the 6th Summit, 
held in Colombia in April 2012, insisted on Cuba’s inclusion; however, the United States 
vetoed the demand, which led to a summit boycott by the presidents of Ecuador and 
Nicaragua.  In addition, U.S. free trade agreements were not advanced, partially because 
of organizations such as ALBA, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), including 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC), excluding the United States.  Deemed as a 
failure for the United States, the 6th Summit of the Americas provided a success for 
Chavez, demonstrating that the region hegemon may slowly be losing its economic claim 
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Chavez Impacts U.S. Security and Stability 
Chavez’s Relationship with Ahmadinejad 
Chavez teamed with international leaders who had the capability to significantly 
negatively affect U.S. interests, such as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  
However, less direct threatening relationships included Cuban President Raul Castro and 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  As policy makers continued to gather intelligence and 
speculate on Chavez’s intentions to threaten the United States, immediate attention was 
focused on the relationship between Chavez and Ahmadinejad.  
Primarily funded by Iran, Hezbollah was the radical Lebanon-based Islamic Shiite 
group, which the U.S. State Department designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
86
  
Hezbollah was a nationalist entity and a political actor in Lebanon.  Since the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Hezbollah transformed into an anti-imperialist party with a 
mission to counter the regional hegemonies: Israel and the United States.
87
  During 
Syria’s uprising, Hezbollah supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and carried out 
attacks against the Syrian resistance.
88
 
Hezbollah’s actions extended beyond the Middle East.  For example, Hezbollah 
proved their extra-territorial destructive capabilities by carrying out two attacks against 
Jewish and Israeli buildings in Buenos Aires, Argentina in the early 1990s.  Both attacks 
were believed to have been financed by Iran.
89
  The first attack in 1992 killed 30 people 
at the Israeli Embassy, and two years later 85 people died when the Argentine-Israeli 
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Mutual Association of Buenos Aires was bombed.
90
  The primary strategic interest of 
Hezbollah, in Latin America, appeared to be centered on raising funds to supplement its 
other income streams derived from global collections outside of the Middle East.
91
 
Growing concern escalated regarding Hezbollah’s continued access to and presence in 
Latin America.  In 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office and 
quickly identified commonalities with Venezuela’s leader Hugo Chavez.  Chavez and 
Ahmadinejad united in a mission to build an anti-imperialist and anti-American coalition 
of nations.
92
  During one of Chavez’s many visits to Tehran, he referred to Ahmadinejad 
as his “ideological brother.”  Chavez went on to say “co-operation of independent 
countries such as Iran and Venezuela has an effective role in defeating the policies of 
imperialism and saving nations.”
93
  In other words, these leaders publically 
acknowledged their intentions to defy the United States and join to remove the United 
States as the world’s superpower. 
During a congressional hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Chairman Ros-Lehteinen indicated an increased presence of Iran’s Quds Force in 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador, as well as offices of Iran’s intelligence 
services surfacing throughout the region.
94
  Additionally, in May 2011, the Iranian 
Defense Minister inaugurated a military training school in Bolivia for ALBA countries, 
which was financed by the Iranian regime.
95
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In addition to sharing similar ideological views, Chavez and Ahmadinejad shared 
ties in the energy arena.  Iran and Venezuela were both top world oil producers and 
became respectively the world’s fifth and eleventh-largest out of 217 countries.
96
   Links 
between these two countries had historical roots as Iran and Venezuela were co-founders 
of OPEC in the 1960s.
97
  Indeed, both countries had the ability to manipulate oil prices on 




As the United States continued enforcing economic sanctions on Iran, 
Ahmadinejad pursued efforts to gain support in Latin America, primarily in Venezuela.  
Ahmadinejad diplomatically prevailed by opening six new embassies in Latin America, 
totaling eleven Islamic Republic embassies in the region, an oddity given the 
geographical and cultural distances between Iran and countries in the region.
99
  Still, 
Chavez was Iran’s most vocal supporter in Latin America, most notably in support of 
Iran’s alleged nuclear program.
100
  In return, Ahmadinejad concentrated on economic 
partnerships with Chavez by collaborating on Venezuelan projects, such as tractor 
factories, milk plants, and joint car factories.
101
  However, these collaborative projects 
created unease, especially when an Iran-owned cement plant in Venezuela was accused 
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of manufacturing and shipping cocaine to West Africa and Europe.
102
  Profits earned 
from drug trafficking were reported to fund Hezbollah efforts globally.  
Iranian-Venezuelan cooperation was particularly troublesome in its security 
aspects.  In 2008, Turkish officials confiscated 22 containers marked “tractor parts” 
heading from Iran to Venezuela, where bomb-making materials and weapons were 
found.
103
  In September 2009, a nuclear cooperation agreement was signed by Venezuela 
and Iran, which formalized that Iran would help Venezuela build a “nuclear villa.”
104
  
Additionally, Venezuelan officials admitted that Iran assisted with the exploration of 
uranium deposits in Venezuela.   
Increased U.S. attention was placed on the strengthening relationship between 
Chavez and Ahmadinejad.  Since 2010, weekly flights from Venezuela to Iran, via Syria, 
were added to Venezuela’s Conviasa and IranAir routes.  U.S. officials were concerned 
that this ease of travel would grant Hezbollah increased access to the Western 
Hemisphere, which could have led to added support by the radical Shiite population in 
Venezuela.
105
  Policy makers argued Venezuela was transforming into a safe haven for 
terrorists.   
Iran and Hezbollah continued to cause the DOD to invest time and resources in 
dismantling their drug and terrorist activities.  During the Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing in March 2009, U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis raised concerns 
of increased Hezbollah activities in Latin America.
106
  Stavridis announced “another 
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threat to the United States is the nexus with Islamic radical terrorism…U.S. Southern 
Command supported a drug enforcement operation, which targeted a Hezbollah-
connected drug trafficking organization…A robust Hezbollah financial support network 
exists in the region, as well as an active group of sympathizers and supporters of 
Hezbollah.”
107
   
Adding to Chavez’s support for Iran and Hezbollah, Chavez placed natives of 
Iran-allied countries in top positions in Venezuela’s government.  Tareck el Aissami, a 
Venezuelan national of Syrian descent, was Chavez’s Justice and Interior Minister and 
responsible for Venezuela’s passport agency.
108
  Previously, the deputy director of 
Identification and Immigration Directorate, Aissami was in charge of Venezuela’s border 
controls and issuing passports and national ID cards.
109
  Tareck’s father, Carlos Aissami, 
was head of the Venezuelan branch of the Iraqi Baath political party.  Moreover, Carlos 
publically referred to Osama Bin Laden as “the great Mujahedeen” and called President 
Bush “genocidal, mentally deranged, a liar and a racist.”
110
 
Another top Venezuelan official, Ghazi Nassereddine, was a native of Lebanon 
who has became naturalized Venezuelan and had familial connections to Hezbollah.
111
  
Nassereddine was Chavez’s second highest ranking diplomat in Syria and was suspected 
of operating Hezbollah’s network in Latin America.
112
  Ghazi’s brother, Abdullah, was a 
former member of the Venezuelan congress and previous vice president of the Federation 
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of Arab and American Entities in Latin America.
113
  Abdullah resided in Venezuela and 
managed the business operations of Hezbollah in Latin America.
114
  Additionally, 
Ghazi’s younger brother Oday was responsible for running paramilitary training centers 
and recruiting Venezuelans to send to Iran for radical training.
115
  Deliberately placing 
Iran supporters in positions of power in Venezuela’s government demonstrates that the 
future policies of both countries could have become intertwined, and thereby created 
regional hostility to U.S. national security interests.     
In order to escape the pain of U.S. imposed sanctions, Iran established financial 
institutions in Venezuela.  Specifically, a bi-national Iranian-Venezuelan development 
bank, and Iranian-owned universal bank (Bank Saderat), Iranian commercial banks in 
Caracas, and a bi-national investment and development fund assisted Iran in evading 
United Nations Security Council resolutions.
116
 
Iran and Venezuela were noted by the Brookings Institute as the “worst 
offenders” to value ideology in their foreign policies.
117
  When radical ideologies were 
used to justify support for terrorism, this created a national security issue for the United 
States.  Historically, countries whose leadership structured foreign policy based on 
radical ideologies eventually caused trouble for the United States, such as Germany, 
North Korea, Cuba, and Iraq.  Moreover, spreading this ideology throughout Latin 
America was made readily possible by the launch of HispanTV in 2011.   Disseminating 
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Iranian Shi’ite propaganda along with state-approved news, documentaries, and 
Iranian films, this channel was also used to send secret messages to Hezbollah.
118
   
For decades, the United States assisted Latin America in their fight against 
terrorism and insurgent groups harmful to the region.  Specifically, the United States 
provided its law enforcement resources to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and money 
laundering in the region.  The United States displayed its awareness of Venezuela’s threat 
by listing Venezuela as one of the two Latin American countries “not cooperating fully 
with United States antiterrorism efforts” according to Section 40A of the Arms Export 
Control Act.
119
  Although the U.S. military was undoubtedly capable of minimizing 
Venezuela’s military, minimizing the emerging international terrorist group Hezbollah 
movement backed by Venezuela created increased challenges in the region. 
 
Venezuela’s Armament 
 Venezuela last fought a war in 1821, where independence was gained from Spain; 
yet Chavez heavily invested in armaments.  Chavez’s fascination with military arms has 
significantly increased throughout his presidency.  Having borrowed more than $2 billion 
from Russia to buy Russian-made tanks and antiaircraft missile systems, Chavez claimed 
the armament was to “protect its vast oil reserves from the United States.”
120
   
Specifically, the following documented purchases were made by Chavez: 24 Sukhoi 
fighter jets; T-72 tanks; air defense systems; over 100,000 assault rifles; AK-47 rifles.  
Also, an agreement was signed between Russia and Venezuela to build a Kalashnikov 
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factory in Venezuela, capable of producing 25,000 rifles annually.
121
  In 2012, Chavez 
began assembling Kalashnikov assault rifles and surveillance drones, and making 
grenades and ammunition with Russian assistance.
122
  Even with these non-confidential 
acquisitions, U.S. national security was lnot directly threatened.  Instead, the U.S. 
administration was more concerned that Chavez could export assembled weapons to 
organizations promoting drug trafficking or radical ideologies in the Western 
Hemisphere, such as FARC, ELN or Hezbollah. 
  
Chavez’s Intentions 
 Throughout this paper, Chavez was referenced as if he was the state of Venezuela.  
This was done because his actions as president, since 1999, proved his regional influence 
was more powerful than the state of Venezuela.  By manipulating Venezuela’s economy, 
seizing control over their main money-making enterprise, and hand-selecting government 
officials, people around the world referenced Chavez versus the state of Venezuela.   
 It appeared counterintuitive that Chavez kept the United States as their number 
one oil customer, while simultaneously attempting to weaken the U.S. hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere.  It was important to recognize that Venezuela’s oil was an unusual 
industry, in that the oil from Venezuela was heavier and contained more sulfur, so it has 
to be refined differently from other oil.  The United States was one of the few places 
operating refineries capable of refining Venezuelan oil; therefore, Chavez needed U.S. 
support to refine his oil.  In addition, since the majority of the educated employees of 
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PDVSA either quit or were fired, the Venezuelan refineries were operating at a much 
lower capacity than they were capable of, and the infrastructure continued to weaken.   
Paradoxically, the question arose as to what interests Chavez was protecting by opposing 
the United States.  In order to be seen as a regional power, Chavez had to have an enemy.  
All heroes have a villain.  Chavez tried to polarize the hemisphere so that he could be 
seen as the leader of the opposition, rather than just the leader of one of many small states 
in the region.  Hence, it was for political gain.  On the other hand, other people believe 
Chavez had a personal vendetta against the United States, based on events from his past.  
When Chavez was a student at the Venezuelan military academy, the United States 
supplied trainers and advisors to the academy.  He may have had negative encounters 
with Americans throughout his duration at the academy.  Moreover, Chavez blamed the 
Central Intelligence Agency for the alleged coup plot in 2002 to overflow his presidency. 
Profits used from the United States directly aided Chavez’s efforts to further his 21st 
Century Socialism.  Resources invested by the United States on Venezuelan oil was used 
to undermine the United States and democracy, which compromised a goal of the U.S. 
National Security Strategy.
123
  Unless the United States adopted alternatives to oil and 
reduced dependency on foreign oil, such as Venezuela, anti-American leaders, such as 
Chavez, continued to exploit oil money to maintain power. 
 
Conclusion 
The case study on Venezuela justified the hypothesis that Hugo Chavez’s policies 
affected U.S. interests within Latin America.  Chavez created U.S. dependence on foreign 
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oil from a corrupt nation and he aided in advancing terrorists in the Western Hemisphere.  
Chavez’s actions could have led to a regional crisis.  As a small rogue state, Venezuela 
possessed the power to affect the regional hegemon’s interests.  While policy makers 
recognized that Chavez’s power was waning due to severe health conditions, the United 
States took a quiet diplomatic approach, utilizing soft power methods to curtail Chavez’s 
anti-American policies.  Nevertheless, U.S. policy makers should have taken Chavez’s 
radical ideologies seriously and done more to gather intelligence of his impacts on U.S. 
economic and security interests.   
First, Chavez’s changes to Venezuela’s government countered the spread of 
democracy throughout Latin America.  Chavez’s adoption of 21st Century Socialism, 
new presidential decrees, and lack of governmental checks and balance was not positive 
for the Western Hemisphere.  As the United States continued to support free trade, 
democracy, and citizen equality Chavez publically denounced the United States and 
proclaimed his anti-American agenda.  While all of these actions justified Chavez as 
being harmful to the democratic process, it cannot be shown that he directly affected U.S. 
democratic interests.  
Next, U.S. reliance on Venezuela’s oil alone showed Chavez directly affected 
U.S. economic interests.  Additionally, Chavez’s unconditional support for Cuba, which 
countered U.S.-imposed sanctions against Cuba, sent a clear message that Chavez was 
not intimidated by the United States.  Moreover, Chavez’s influence over the ALBA 




Lastly, Chavez’s relationship with Iran and Russia directly affected U.S. security 
interests.  Additionally, Venezuela’s influx of armament created unease within the 
Western Hemisphere.  Whether U.S. policy makers supported Chavez, attacked his 
policies, or denied that he posed a threat to the United States, most would concur that 
U.S. interests were in some way affected by Venezuela.  Regarding the security effects, 
foreign policy makers debated whether it was the right time to add Venezuela to the state 
of sponsor terrorism list, insisting that Venezuela no longer actively or passively aided 
terrorist organizations.  
As intelligence was carefully analyzed, analysts solidified the threat level Chavez 
could pose to the United States as low.  Venezuela was only 550 miles away from the 
U.S. territory Puerto Rico and approximately 1,300 miles from Florida.
124
  As of 2012, 
approximately 18,000 U.S. citizens reside in Venezuela, an estimated 13,000 U.S. tourists 
visited annually, and around 500 U.S. companies were represented in Venezuela.
125
  
Eventually a more tailored and cohesive strategy that actively sought to change 
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Uncontrolled drug trafficking, increased transnational organized crime, 
government corruption, poverty, abductions, murders, and lack of fully developed states 
in Central America, represent a threat to the U.S. security on multiple levels.  Latin 
American countries range from under-developed to developed countries, some of which 
represent a military and financial counterbalance to the United States, such as Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Brazil, to those that foster increased drug and human trafficking, unsafe 
working conditions, and abysmal economies.  The new Latin American reality is nuanced 
and U.S. policy toward the region must be analyzed accordingly.  What began as a 
traditional security mission for the United States in Central America during the late Cold 
War has morphed into an anti-drug law enforcement adjunct mission.  Although a 
legitimate operation, drug interdiction performed by the U.S. military has yielded both 
positive, negative, and useless results.  By examining the efficacy of U.S. military 
missions in the key sub-region of Latin America, Central America, decisions can be made 
as to whether to continue, cancel, or alter U.S. policy in the region. 
Uniquely situated between the North and South of the American continent and 
East and West of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, Central America has become the key 
transshipment zone for drugs in the Western Hemisphere.  Although countries in Central 
America are largely interested in combating an increase in illicit trafficking of arms, 
drugs, and humans, such countries have been unable to effectively control such transit 
47 
 
and thus secure the region.
126
  Therefore, the United States has adopted a strategy using 
interagency coordination to approach regional issues of security and stability.  This paper 
will examine whether U.S. presence in Central America, using Honduras as the case 
study, strengthens implementation of the U.S. Southern Command Strategy 
(SOUTHCOM) in accordance with the U.S. National Security Strategy.  First, the paper 
examines the U.S.-Central America relationship and identifies the importance of 
strengthening a regional security strategy.  The paper then goes on to detail the 
transnational organized crime and drug-related challenges in Central America by 
discussing whether the region poses a significant threat to U.S. national and international 
security.  The paper further explains why Honduras became a vital ally for the United 
States since the 1980s and specifically Honduras’ strategic function within Central 
America.  Lastly, the paper will address whether there have been improvements in 
Honduras due to current U.S. operations in-country as well as explore how U.S. resources 
in Honduras contribute to Central America’s overall regional stability.  
 
U.S. Interests and Historical Involvement in Central America 
 It is necessary to understand Central America’s geographical significance in order 
to comprehend its foundational advantages.  Central America connects the United States 
to Latin America and to the rest of the world.  Central America is comprised of seven 
countries: Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Panama.  Encompassing approximately 521,876 square kilometers, with a population 
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estimated at 43 million, Central America is slightly larger than Texas and California 
combined, yet less populated by 22 million people.
127-128  Additionally, the Panama Canal 
enables access for the entire world to transport goods via maritime.  In 2012 alone, 
14,544 vessels passed through the Panama Canal originating from countries in every 
region of the world.
129
  Although Central America’s size may not be as immense as other 
regions, these seven distinct nations with seven separate currencies are each trying to 
overcome significant security challenges, which ultimately contribute to insecurity in the 
region. 
 Prior to the late 1940s, the United States had not developed a strategy to contain 
communism, nor a specific plan to deal with reformists or revolutionary Latin American 
governments.  During the Cold War, the United States was put in reactionary positions 
regarding the Western Hemisphere, rather than proactive situations, until forming strong 
bilateral relations with Honduras.  Before U.S. engagement with Honduras, the U.S. 
feared a communist takeover in Latin America.  Therefore, the United States initiated 
operations to disrupt revolutions, such as Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, and Chile in 1973.
130
  
 The U.S. involvement in Honduras stems from its involvement in neighboring 
Nicaragua.  Transitioning from the Carter administration to the Reagan administration, 
the U.S. government attempted to destabilize Nicaragua’s government by removing the 
Sandinistas (communist political party) from power.  In order to escalate pressure and 
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disrupt Nicaragua, the United States used Honduras as its forward operating location.  In 
1981, the United States stood up a military base, today known as Soto Cano Air Base, 
where they trained the Honduran military, utilized espionage from air, sea, and land, and 
transported equipment, used in the battle against Nicaragua.  During this period, 
assistance from the United States to Honduras was the highest it has ever been, averaging 
annual amounts of military assistance at $57 million and economic assistance at $179 
million.
131
  By 1989, direct U.S. aid to the Contras, anti-Sandinista counter-
revolutionaries, aimed at dismantling Nicaragua’s government and totaled over $400 
million.
132
  Ironically, although the Reagan administration’s rhetoric to get the American 
public onboard with supporting the Contras was to attack the Sandinistas as human rights 
violators, a Human Rights Watch report found that supporting the Contras resulted in 
gross human rights abuses.
133
  By the mid-1980s, Congress withdrew U.S. taxpayer 
dollars to fund the Contras and started to break away from toppling the Nicaraguan 
government.  However, the Reagan administration refused to allow the Sandinistas to 
secure power and brokered an illicit arms deal with Iran (following the Iran Hostage 
Crisis in 1979), which provided “off-the-books” weapons and funds for the Contras, 
using Honduras as the staging ground.
134
  In the end, the United States used Honduras to 
counter Nicaragua’s socialist movement because the U.S. government believed the 
Sandinistas threatened U.S. national interests.   
 During the 1980s, the United States was heavily engaged in Central America’s 
development and was noticeably present throughout the region.  Indeed, the United States 
                                                          
131
 Ibid. p272. 
132
 Ibid. p91. 
133
 “Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986.” The Americas Watch Committee. February 1987. p136.  
134
 Booth, John and Wade, Christine and Walker, Thomas. “Understanding Central America: Global 
Forces, Rebellion, and Change.” Westview Press. Fifth Edition. 2010. p91. 
50 
 
provided approximately $1.3 billion annually in financial support for economic and 
military assistance, which supported efforts to combat leftist political movements.
135
  
However, as the Cold War ebbed, U.S. physical presence and financial support to the 
region drastically declined, leaving weak and war-torn nations vulnerable to illicit 
trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people.  Once U.S. national security interests were no 
longer vulnerable to communism, U.S. assistance to Central America averaged $411 
million annually until 2007, practically a third of the aid in the 1980s.
136
           
 
U.S. Initiatives 
 The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) was launched in 2010 
as an addition to the 2007 Merida Initiative.
137
  Under the Bush Administration, the 
Merida Initiative was a partnership between Mexico and the United States to combat drug 
trafficking and transnational crime.  In 2007, the Merida Initiative allocated $1.4 billion 
in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America over multiple years.
138
  Additionally, 
in 2008, Congress appropriated $466 million in supplemental assistance to Mexico and 
Central America with a second installment of Merida funding of $100 million for Central 
America in 2009.
139
  Moreover, House Resolution 6028 authorized $1.6 billion over 2008 
to 2009 for Mexico and Central America.
140
  These funds were specifically designated for 
funding counternarcotics (CN) operations.  Prior to 2007, CN funds for Mexico and 
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Central America were debatably minuscule as the only Central American countries to 
receive CN funds were Guatemala ($1.9 million) and Panama ($3.3 million).
141
  During 
this period, funding operations in Afghanistan and Iraq outweighed combating drug-
related crimes in Central America.  Nevertheless, since 2007, U.S. policy makers have 
begun to take transnational crime and illicit trafficking seriously, and in doing so, have 
started appropriating foreign aid throughout each U.S. budget.    
 Although Central America consists of democratic governments, according to the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, this region has become “one of the most 
dangerous on earth.”
142
  In fact, more people are dying in Central America today, than at 
the height of its civil wars in the 1980s.
143
  The U.S. is assisting Central America by 
increasing partnerships and focusing on regional security.  CARSI is a direct result of 
efforts in assisting Central American with these struggles.  This $165 million assistance 
package was provided to accomplish five goals: 1) create safe streets for the citizens in 
the region; 2) disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband; 3) support the 
development of Central American governments; 4) re-establish effective state presence 
and security in communities at risk; 5) foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law 
coordination between the nations.
144
  As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, 
“the United States is committed to citizen safety in Central America…We are doing 
everything we can in the fight against corruption and impunity, in providing the 
equipment and the support that law enforcement and military require, and helping to 
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build civil society to stand against the scourge of drug trafficking.”
145
  Thus, U.S. leaders, 
politicians, and American taxpayers are fully committed to advancing Central America’s 
security. However, since 2007, instead of yielding positive results, the regional 
challenges and threats are greater than ever.   
 
Transnational Organized Crime 
Since the early 2000s, unless a catastrophic event occurred, Central America has 
remained out of mainstream U.S. media coverage.  However, as crime, gang violence, 
illicit trafficking and overall transnational crime have rapidly increased over the past 
decade, Central America has become a focus for reducing threats to U.S. national 
security.  By definition, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) refers to “individuals who 
operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary or 
commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities 
through a pattern of corruption and violence, while protecting their illegal activities 
through a transnational organizational structure.”
146
  Specifically in reference to Central 
America, TOC refers to the drug cartels, gangs, and criminals who illicitly traffic and 
commit violence, which in turns damages nations and communities.  According to the 
Commander of United States Central Command, Central America presents persistent 
challenges and complex threats, harboring corrosive criminal violence, permissive 
environments for illicit activities, and episodic political and social protests.
147
  Moreover, 
President Obama declared in his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 
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“the end-state we seek is to reduce transnational organized crime from a national security 
threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States.”
148
  TOC is not a new 
threat to nations or specifically the United States.  With 15 percent of the U.S. population 
of Hispanic decent and on the rise, and as economic relations with Latin America grow at 
an unprecedented rate; Central America now heavily impacts U.S. national security. 
 
Drug Trafficking & Gangs 
Prior to the 1990s, Mexico was the gateway for drugs transported into the United 
States.  Today, Central America has become the primary transit point for drugs to 
transition from South America, originating from Venezuela, Peru and Colombia, to the 
United States.  Central America’s increased role in drug trafficking has been explained 
differently by individuals largely depending on who they see as responsible.  Ambassador 
of Honduras to the United States, Roberto Flores, links the increased drug trafficking in 
Central America to successful interdiction activities in Caribbean countries in the late 
1980s.  These successful interdiction activities led to increased drug-trafficking to 
Mexico, solidifying alliances with Colombian cartels, which subsequently caused 
Mexican traffickers to spill into Central America.
149
  Another rationale is that the Bush 
Administration created strong partnerships with former Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon, which led to millions of U.S. dollars in assistance to Mexico in their 
counternarcotics operations. This inevitably caused Central America to become the 
secondary region to transport drugs to the Unites States.  In addition, some people blame 
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immigration laws that have been enforced in the United States since 2002, which have 
caused over a million illegal Central American immigrants, with a history of prior drug-
related or violent offenses, to be deported back to their countries of birth.
150
  In turn, 
these criminals have brought their drug-trafficking skills to Central America to teach the 
younger generations and influence communities.  In the end, TOC networks are now 
deeply rooted throughout Central America, causing violence and instability in the region.   
Specifically, northern countries, such as Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, 
have been infiltrated with TOC due to their proximity to Mexico, ungoverned territories, 
and vast coastlines lacking territorial control.  For example, the Mexico-Guatemala 
border is 600 miles long and has only 11 formal ports of entry.
151
  The former head of the 
United Nations International Commission Against Impunity, Carlos Castresana, reported 
that drug traffickers control 60 percent of Central America, and that approximately 50 
percent of Guatemala is under control of drug traffickers.
152
  Moreover, he reported that 
Panama serves as a major transshipment country due to the immediate proximity to 
Colombia, both land and sea.   
Drug trafficking has lead to Central America becoming the world’s highest 
murder rate region, with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras murder rates at 
respectively 58, 45, 84 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to around 20 per 100,000 for 
all of Latin America.
153
  Worryingly, a vast majority of the criminals go unpunished due 
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to weak states and corrupt judicial systems.  Over time, this region’s economic and 
physical insecurity will threaten U.S. national security.   
 
Youth Violence    
 Added to the challenges of transnational crime is the rise in juvenile violence.  
Specifically, young men ages 15 to 25 are involved in the majority of homicides and 
crimes, and are their principle victims.
154
  Gangs, with members linked from Central 
America to the United States, have become extremely complex and diverse.  Two of the 
major gangs with strong roots in the United States are the Mara Salvatrucha (M-13) and 
18th Street.
155
  MS-13 was established in the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who 
had fled El Salvador’s conflicts, and the 18th Street gang was created by Mexican youth 
of Los Angeles in the 1960s.
156
  Actively recruiting the younger generation, these gangs 
have succeeded in taking over local communities and ungoverned areas.  As in many 
countries with continuous poverty, inequality, and unemployment, communities are 
overthrown by criminal or terrorist organizations.  The drug-trafficking market has 
created a cash flow to villages throughout Central America that would otherwise not have 
enough resources to survive.  These children grow up in an environment where drugs are 
relied upon to feed families and provide basic life necessities.  While the United States is 
focused on defeating TOC networks and affecting their ability to operate, preventative 
strategies and efforts must remain at the core of strategic planning.  Reaching children 
                                                          
154
 Ibid. p15.  
155
 Ibid. p15. 
156
 Meyer, Peter and Seelke, Clare.  “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy 
Issues for Congress.”  Congressional Research Service. 7-5700. R41732. CRS Report for Congress. 
February 21, 2012. p10.  
56 
 
before drug traffickers are able to corrupt and control them is imperative in reducing 
criminal facilitators. 
 
Challenges of the Central American Drug War 
Government Corruption 
 Another challenge the United States faces with helping secure Central America is 
corrupt governments and dishonest political systems.  Analysts agree it is difficult to 
precisely measure whether nations are becoming less corrupt, yet, political corruption is 
perceived to have increased with democratization throughout Central America.
157
  
Although the United States has partnered with each Central American country, ultimately 
it is up to the local government to allocate funding toward effective programs to secure 
the state.  For example, the Nicaraguan government failed to account for resources 
Venezuela provided to fund drug trafficking, therefore, the United States curtailed 
security assistance to Nicaragua in 2012.
158
  More than hindering the international 
community, corrupt governments affect their own citizens.  Law abiding citizens and 
taxpayers cannot continue to pay taxes, only to watch their government use the funds 
illegally.  Commitment of U.S. resources has failed to significantly change corrupt 
governments, as the internal issues are too deep and ingrained in political cultures.  For 
these reasons, the United States continues to strengthen partnerships with non-
governmental actors in Central America, as it strives towards enabling honest 
governments, which will benefit both Central America and the United States.     
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U.S. Military Operations in Central America 
U.S. Department of Defense directives have been established to deploy U.S. 
military forces to Central America to assist police and military in increasing public 
security and enforcing stringent anti-gang laws, specifically in El Salvador and 
Honduras.
159
  The U.S. military is performing operations that it was not primarily trained 
to do, which is to protect and defend the United States.  Since the Cold War, mission 
creep has become endemic in U.S. military.  Presently, U.S. politicians and the DOD are 
analyzing whether U.S. Armed Forces maintain the correct posture in Central America, 
yet admit the execution of past operations have failed, causing Central America to 
become one of the most dangerous regions in the world.  An alternative to military 
engagement is to, withdraw U.S Armed Forces from drug enforcement missions and 
reallocate the resources to drug enforcement agencies, such as the Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA).  
SOUTHCOM is the “Unified Combatant Command of the Armed Forces of the 
United States, responsible for conducting military operations and promoting security 
cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean and South America in order to achieve 
U.S. strategic objectives.”
160
  SOUTHCOM receives guidance from the executive branch 
and generates requirements directly from the U.S. National Security Strategy.  
SOUTHCOM’s priorities are captured in three strategic objectives: 1) to defend the 
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United States and its interests; 2) foster regional security; 3) serve as an enduring partner 
of choice in support of a peace and prosperous region.
161
   
SOUTHCOM is challenged to respond to large-scale contingencies, such as mass 
migration, natural disasters, the evacuation of America citizens, as well as ensuring the 
security of U.S. embassies, maintaining comprehensive awareness in the southern 
approaches to the United States, and supporting the National Drug Control Strategy’s 
interdiction objectives.
162
  Additionally, SOUTHCOM monitors national security threats 
in the Western Hemisphere and is prepared to respond to a global crisis and regional 
security issues. 
 U.S. politicians and citizens and Central Americans have responded differently to 
the assistance the U. S. military has provided in the region.  Particularly, the efforts to 
“get tough” on crime, which has brought negative unintended consequences, including 
severe prison overcrowding.
163
  In turn, prisons have become a method for gangs to 
recruit new members and strengthen existing bonds.  Additionally, using military assets 
to facilitate drug interdictions and other law enforcement operations is heavily contested, 
as traditionally the U.S. military has not been structured to execute these missions.     
 On the other hand, SOUTHCOM’s operations provide billions of dollars and 
resources towards humanitarian and counternarcotics missions, which enables Central 
America to foster regional security.  Moreover, SOUTHCOM is committed to supporting 
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the National Drug Control Strategy’s interdiction objectives and engaging in regional 
security challenges.        
 
CASE STUDY:  Honduras 
 Honduras represents an interesting case study that displays U.S. military 
operations in direct response to the U.S. National Security Strategy, respectively in 
Central America’s (CENTAM).  This case provides a thorough understanding of the 
threats escalating in Central America.  Ultimately, this case shows that U.S. operations 
in-country over the past ten years have not advanced U.S. national security interests.  
 There are several possible course of actions addressing U.S. policy goals in 
Honduras.  First, the Joint Task Force in Honduras could continue current U.S. military 
operations and provide monetary resources, and use the Joint Task Force-Bravo to 
support other U.S. agencies and the U.S. State Department in TOC and law enforcement 
missions.  As a second option, U.S. military involvement with Latin America TOC 
operations could cease and resources be reallocated from Joint Task Force-Bravo to the 
DEA, Coast Guard and other agencies in combating TOC.  Third, the U.S. military’s role 
in assisting and supporting counter transnational organized crime operations could be 
acknowledged as necessary for securing U.S. interests; however, eliminate Joint Task 
Force-Bravo as the forward operating base and restructure missions to originate from the 






2007 – Present: Honduras and the United States 
 With a population of approximately 8 million, Honduras shares land borders with 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, while possessing a dual coastline with the 
Pacific Ocean to the southwest and the Caribbean Sea to the north.
164
  Transnational 
organized crime, poverty and official corruption are the dominant civil issues that 
contribute to the country’s daunting social problems, which promote the vitality of the 
country’s drug trade.  According to a United Nations report, Honduras is now the 
deadliest place in the world.
165
  Foreign Policy reported that, “per capita, more people are 
murdered here than in any other country, including Iraq and Afghanistan.  And it’s 
getting worse.”
166
  Honduras’ extensive, sparsely populated border with Guatemala and 
political instability, which also affects the country’s relationship with the United States, 
intensifies these issues.  The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates 
that one-third of the world’s cocaine volume moves through Honduras every month, 
which makes Honduras the world’s largest primary transshipment point for cocaine.
167
 
The amalgamation of these problems poses the concerning question, how has Honduras 
developed into such a dangerous and threatening country, when it is the only Latin 
American country where the United States has not only established a major presence but 
is actively engaged in assisting the Honduran military and populace?   
 A highly contested event occurred on June 28, 2009, where the Honduran 
Supreme Court issued an arrest order for President Zelaya and formally removed him as 
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  The Obama administration harshly responded by suspending U.S. 
assistance to counternarcotics objectives and labeled the situation a coup.
169
  
Immediately, funding for Honduran military and law enforcement programs were cut by 
the State Department.  The coup occurred because the Honduran people did not agree 
with Zelaya and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s close ties, and they were afraid 
Chavez would influence Zelaya into reducing democracy in Honduras, similar to what 
Chavez had done in Venezuela.  Indeed, Chavez had formed an alliance with Honduras in 
order to continue using Honduras as the primary country to transit drugs through air and 
sea routes.  Originating almost exclusively in Venezuela, drugs have caused Honduras to 
become the primary landing point for suspect non-commercial air operations.
170
  The 
suspension of U.S. assistance, due to the coup, caused a larger problem for the United 
States.  Chaos, lack of government control, and limited resources allowed drug 
trafficking organizations (DTO) and TOCs to increase the flow of contraband transiting 
Honduras.  DTOs/TOCs and Honduran contributors utilize Honduran farms to stockpile 
military-grade arms, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades for smuggling into Mexico 




U.S. Operations in Honduras 
Soto Cano Air Base is a Honduran military installation, recognized by the DOD 
as Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B).  Located on Soto Cano Air Base is the largest air 
strip in Central America, which is maintained by the U.S. Air Force.  Comprised of more 
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than 600 U.S. military personnel and more than 650 U.S. and Honduras civilians, JTF-B 
works to build partnerships with Honduras and other Central America countries to foster 
security, stability and prosperity for the Americas.
172
  JTF-B conducts a variety of 
missions in Central and South America, from supporting U.S. Government operations to 
countering transnational crime to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and building 
partner capacities.  JTF-B supports joint, interagency, and combined operations to disrupt 
transnational criminal networks and reduce transnational organized crime from a national 
security threat to a manageable public safety problem within Central America.  From 
2007 to 2012, JTF-B executed approximately $300 million to sustain the base and 
achieve SOUTHCOM objectives.  In accordance with the SOUTHCOM Command 
Strategy for 2020, JTF-B conducts operations to furthering U.S. strategic objectives.   
Analyzing the following U.S. operations performed in Honduras will determine 
whether U.S. presence in Honduras strengthens the U.S. National Security Strategy 
and/or contributes to Central America’s overall regional stability.       
 
Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MEDRETE) 
 U.S. military personnel assigned to JTF-B have been conducting medical 
readiness training exercises in Honduras since 1993.  In 2012, approximately 41,949 
medical patients throughout Central America and Honduras, in eleven distinct 
MEDRETEs, were treated.  These missions enhanced U.S. and Honduran relations 
through medical training with Honduran military forces and local civilian organizations, 
while supporting the Ministry of Health’s efforts to provide medical care to the Honduran 
population.  JTF-B unites key members of the U.S. and Honduran governments as well as 
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non-governmental organizations.  The average MEDRETE involves providing primary 
care at remote locations in conjunction with the Honduran Ministry of Health including, 
but not limited to: preventative medicine education, primary medical care, 




 For MEDRETEs operations outside of Honduras, U.S. military aircraft are used to 
transport the team, which usually encompasses between 30 to 50 personnel, comprised of 
air crew, medical personnel, administrative personnel and Honduran liaison officers.  
Calculating fuel and man-hours to fly the aircraft, medical supplies used and distributed 
to patients, plus each member’s per diem expenses, an average cost per MEDRETE can 
quickly surpass $200 thousand.  MEDRETEs within Honduras are executed using either 
military aircraft or ground transportation, similarly exhausting hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.  Locations and populace chosen where MEDRETEs are performed, prior to 2013, 
were selected by the U.S. Embassies throughout Central America, as well as the 
respective country’s Ministry of Health.  Typically, remote villages with extreme poverty 
and limited access to medical facilities were chosen.  Without question, these 
MEDRETEs provide superb medical treatment for Central Americans they would 
otherwise never have received, including life saving surgeries.  The dilemma arises when, 
after 19 years of providing expensive and time-consuming MEDRETEs, transnational 
organized crime, drug trafficking, and government corruption has increased, specifically 
in Honduras.  SOUTHCOM cannot continue to justify these operations, year after year, 
when the only positive take-away from those MEDRETEs has been fostering regional 
security and preventative medical assistance.  It has taken the United States decades and 





millions of dollars to finally realize providing MEDRETEs throughout Central America 
will not stop TOC from increasing, nor will it disrupt illicit trafficking. 
 Beginning in 2013, JTF-B has changed the vision of future MEDRETEs, by 
strategically selecting locations where drug trafficking primary influences the majority 
populace.  For example, in February 2013, JTF-B preformed a four-day MEDRETE in 
the Darien province villages in Panama, which borders Colombia and is known as a safe-
haven for the terrorist organization Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  
Although it is too soon to see any strategic successes from this MEDRETE, 
SOUTHCOM will continue to monitor changes in illicit trafficking routes in this specific 
region. 
 Assuming future MEDRETEs are targeted to strategic locations and predicting the 
missions advance U.S. national interests, the analysis of whether U.S. operations need to 
be based in Honduras still remains.  Does U.S. presence in Honduras strengthen U.S. 
national security?  In other words, could the United States still continue these 
MEDRETEs throughout Central America without physically originating from Honduras?  
These missions could be successfully performed if U.S. presence was not in Honduras.  
More specifically, MEDRETE teams could originate from U.S. military bases in Florida 
or other bases within the United States.  Had the MEDRETE to the Darien province in 
Panama been based out of the United States, the military would have saved over fifty 
thousand dollars in transporting the members to Panama.  Overall, SOUTHCOM 
objectives could be achieved even if U.S. presence was not in Honduras.  Although 
Central America’s regional stability is strengthened through MEDRETEs, defending the 
United States and its interests, fostering regional security, and serving as an enduring 
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partner are objectives the United States could still accomplish if JTF-B was relocated 
from Honduras to the United States.        
 
Central America Sharing Mutual Operational Knowledge and Experiences (CENTAM 
SMOKE) 
 Exercise CENTAM SMOKE is a quarterly, four-day exercise that trains up to 35 
firefighters from throughout Central America in areas from personnel protective 
equipment to helicopter egress operations to basic medical procedures.
174
  The primary 
purpose of conducting Exercise CENTAM SMOKE is to support DOD aircrews 
operating in Central America by training neighboring Central American firefighters and 
increasing mutual aid posture.  CENTAM SMOKE provides hands-on training with U.S. 
air assets to facilitate future disaster relief efforts and medical evacuations and promote 
regional cooperation through peacetime engagement to improve collective capabilities 
and strengthen regional partnerships.
175
  Since 2007, JTF-B has trained 730 firefighters 
from Central America, including the Honduran Air Force Academy.
176
 
 Ensuring Honduran firefighters are equipped for disaster relief efforts and 
firefighting skills is an absolute necessity for Honduran stability.  In fact, one of the 
world’s deadliest prison fires occurred in February 2012, in Comayagua, Honduras, 
approximately three miles from Soto Cano Air Base, where 355 people died.
177
  In 2003 
and 2004, two other prison fires resulted in the death of 176 inmates, where government 
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officials were convicted of starting the fire.
178
  Moreover, the U.S. State Department has 
criticized Honduran prisons and detention centers, stating that prisons are severely 
overcrowded, malnutrition endemic, and prisoners subject to various abuses.
179
  The 
Associated Press reported that Honduran prisons operate more like a “free-market 
bazaar,” where inmates sell everything from iPhones to prostitutes, and consist of 800-
plus prisoners in ten cellblocks.
180
  Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights said the Honduran government has “all but abandoned its penitentiary system.”
181
  
 Undeniably, the efforts of JTF-B to train Honduran firefighters provide 
opportunities for acquiring valuable skill sets, which increase the country’s stability and 
save lives.  However, JTF-B presence in Honduras has not been able to reduce corruption 
in the Honduras government, which in these specific examples of prison overcrowding 
and fires, could have been avoided.  Furthermore, CENTAM SMOKE exercises could be 
executed without U.S. presence based in Honduras.  These quarterly missions can 
maintain Central America’s regional stability and advance enduring partnerships if JTF-B 
was relocated from Honduras to the United States.     
 
Counter Transnational Organized Crime (C-TOC) 
 Joint Task Force-Bravo’s number one priority is countering transnational 
organized crime, by transporting items by ground and air for interagency operations 
within Honduras and throughout Central America and sustaining three forward operating 
locations with refueling capabilities within Honduras.  Missions, which involve any 
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degree of countering transnational organized crime, are commonly known as C-TOC.  
Essentially, JTF-B is a forward stationed C-TOC asset, assisting U.S. and partner nations 
in efficiently detecting, monitoring, and interdicting TOC operations within Central 
America.  One common misconception is that JTF-B and DOD personnel actually 
conduct the C-TOC objectives; however, Honduras is a sovereign nation, which imposes 
a multitude of limitations for DOD.  Therefore, the DOD is highly restricted from directly 
engaging in C-TOC missions.  For example, JTF-B is required to land helicopters at least 
500 meters from a hostile environment, whether transporting Honduran military, 
equipment, or personnel.  Unlike in Iraq or Afghanistan, where other agencies lead all C-
TOC missions, and DOD is only authorized to provide support, such as refueling and 
transportation capabilities, any operation must be coordinated through and with the 
Honduran government and military.   
As drug trafficking increases in Honduras, and simultaneously Colombia and 
Venezuela amplify the drug routes originating in Honduras, SOUTHCOM’s mission is 
directed towards countering these threats.  In fact, in 2012, JTF-B participated for the 
first time, in a mission known as Operation Anvil, where the U.S. military teamed with 
the U.S. State Department, the DEA and the Honduran police to detect heavy drug 
trafficking in specifics areas in Honduras over a duration of approximately sixty days.  
Suspicious aircrafts, boats, and villages were monitored and intercepted to confiscate 
illegal substances.  After two months of Operation Anvil, five interdictions resulted in the 
seizure of 2,360 kilograms of cocaine (approximately three quarters of a ton), seven 
detainees, and sixteen pending indictments.
182
  Dedicating six months towards this 
operation and spending roughly $200 million, the tangible results achieved could have 
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been attained a multiple of other ways.  The amount of cocaine confiscated during 
Operation Anvil does not equate to nor surpasses the resources exhausted.   
95 percent of the drug flights from South America to Central America land in 
Honduras, making the country the primary landing point for suspect non-commercial air 
operations.
183
  Furthermore, the U.S. government estimates that 47 metric tons of cocaine 
entered Honduras in 2010.
184
  Therefore, assuming the amount of cocaine that transited 
through Honduras in 2012 was between 47 to 55 metric tons, then the three quarters of a 
ton seized in Operation Anvil has an extremely minimal impact to C-TOC. 
Moreover, JTF-B’s primary role in C-TOC operations is to support other 
agencies, specifically the U.S. State Department, either by providing refuel capabilities, 
medical assistance, or transporting equipment via land or air.  In other words, JTF-B does 
not have authorization to directly interfere with TOC in Honduras.  JTF-B is only 
authorized to provide support.  Therefore, maintaining Soto Cano simply to provide 
assistance to other agencies is not the most efficient use of U.S. resources.     
 
Why the U.S. Military Continues to Stay 
 U.S. military presence in Central America, and throughout Latin America 
provides a sense of stability and perception of protection.  Specifically regarding JTF-B, 
the MEDRETEs, CENTAM SMOKE, and C-TOC operations direct contribute to U.S.–
Honduras nation building objectives and provide a model for future military units to 
follow in sovereign nations.  Unlike recent areas of responsibility, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Honduras is argued to be the first opportunity for the U.S. military to train 







in C-TOC environments, in a sovereign nation, operating with constrained authorities.  
JTF-B is fully nested with the host nation in engaging in missions, as each flight that 
lands or departs from Soto Cano must first receive host nation approval. 
 JTF-B is effective in training Honduran military to counter TOC missions on their 
own.  JTF-B uses C-TOC and MEDRETE missions to account for flying hours in 
keeping U.S. military pilots and aircrew qualified.  JTF-B is successful at providing 
humanitarian assistance throughout Central America, sponsoring multiple orphanages, 
supporting non-governmental organizations, and responding with disaster relief.  For 
these reasons, SOUTHCOM continues to fund JTF-B as a mission requirement and 
maintains JTF-B’s presence in Honduras as necessary in disrupting drug flow and overall 
decreasing transnational organized crime.  
 
Conclusion 
Transnational organized crime is a significant threat to national and international 
security.  It is a global issue with global implications and it affects U.S. interests 
throughout all international areas.  Threats to the United States exist in Central America, 
primarily as a result of drug trafficking organizations, which lead to government 
corruption and economic breakdown.  Moreover, due to proximity, the United States 
must remain engaged with the nations in our shared Western Hemisphere.  U.S. national 
security is vulnerable if co-located in a region with criminally-governed spaces.
185
   
Fighting the war on drugs and responding to crises resulting from drug-related 
issues should ultimately be the responsibility of law enforcement agencies, with minimal 
                                                          
185
 General John F. Kelly. “Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps 
Commander, United States Southern Command.” 113th Congress. House Armed Services Committee. 
March 20, 2013. p11. 
70 
 
assistance from the DOD.  Specifically, U.S. military assets should be used to help with 
training, logistical support, and military-to-military relationship building between 
nations.  Extending U.S. military involvement by establishing an enduring presence has 
had minimal positive results in Honduras.  Moreover, even with a large U.S. military 
presence in Honduras, the country has become the gateway for drug trafficking in the 
Western Hemisphere and one of the most dangerous countries in Latin America.  
 Within Honduras, the state capacity is weakening and corruption and impunity are 
rampant.  This corrosive expansion is taking place in the context of deteriorating citizen 
security, where the number of people killed rivals that of Iraq at the height of sectarian 
violence.
186
  After investing billions of dollars into JTF-B over decades, there is a 
minimal return for the United States in Honduras.  Without question, the United States 
has been able to extend diplomacy through humanitarian and disaster relief efforts 
through JTF-B; however, these partnership-building missions could have been 
accomplished using JTF-B as the forward operating base.  It is not only possible, but 
extremely cost effective, for the U.S. Air Force to continue maintaining the Soto Cano 
runway for future missions, without the JTF-B presence. 
  In order to determine the best use of resources, especially during an era of budget 
austerity for the United States, the military’s decision to remain postured in Honduras 
must be reevaluated.  SOUTHCOM’s counter transnational organized crime efforts can 
continue to remain aligned with counterterrorism objectives without being physically 
based in Honduras.  Additionally, the United States can still maintain vigilance in 
monitoring and guarding against an opportunistic or growing nexus between foreign 










CHAPTER THREE:  EXAMINING CHINA & LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
China’s emergence, as a global power, yields profound implications for the 
security and economic U.S. interests.  The magnitude of China’s “going-out” strategy to 
secure nature resources to fuel its quest for global power is unprecedented.  Within the 
United States, two views are predominantly debated on how best to interpret China’s soft 
power projection, specifically with countries in Latin America.  Whereas one side argues 
that China’s expanding presence in Latin America is principally a threat, the other side 
views China’s rise as harmless and in logically positive for U.S. interests.  This paper 
seeks to evaluate how the United States should respond to China’s aggressive 
achievements towards becoming a developed nation by expanding into Latin America’s 
doorstep in pursuit of natural resources.   
Now, better and cheaper trade routes have allowed a global economy, in which 
other factors, such as climate control, freshwater availability, sea water levels, and a 
country’s wealth – combining gross domestic product (GDP) and collective knowledge – 
will ultimately determine how well a country can harvest natural resources or afford to 
import or genetically reproduce them.   
 This chapter will explore the benefits and risks associated with the LAC–China 
trade in natural resources.  Additionally, this chapter examines why China has targeted 
natural resources in LAC and the way in which China’s raw material scarcity, combined 
with a rampant population and industrial growth, is of grave concern to China’s populace 
and countries relying on products produced in China.  By exploring the dominant LAC 
countries exporting natural resources to China and analyzing how the future of the 
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commodities will yield fruits of growth for these countries, the United States will be in a 
position to assist China’s quest in LAC or stand aside.  Ultimately, this paper will 
highlight how LAC’s natural resource endowments are vital to economic growth and an 
economic relationship with China. 
 The China–LAC economic relationship was almost nonexistent until the 21st 
century, in which an incline in natural resources sparked, and continued to fuel, trade 
between these nations.  China is one of the most important engines of the international 
economy, currently using 40 percent of cement, 31 percent of coal, 30 percent of iron 
mineral, 27 percent of steel, 25 percent of aluminum, and 20 percent of copper 
worldwide.
187
  From 2000 to 2010, annual trade, including natural resources, grew 
between LAC and China by 1,200 percent from $10 billion to $130 billion.
188
  As a 
result, Latin American countries heavily depend on China as a market for their exports.  
 Renewable resources, such as water, fisheries and soybeans are some of the 
world’s most precious natural commodities.
189
  Non-renewables, such as oil, gas, and 
metal ores are used to convert energy, and without this energy the world that operates in 
the 21st century would come to a halt.  Countries strive to manage natural resources and 
allocate resources towards innovative technologies.  Indeed, possessing diverse 
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China’s Natural Resource Scarcity   
 Beginning around 2002 and 2003, the Chinese economy entered a period of 
energy and capital-intensive heavy industrial growth.  Between 2000 and 2008, China 
was responsible for two-thirds of total global growth for steel and aluminum and for an 
even higher percentage in global demand for copper.
190
  This, in turn, intensified demand 
for raw materials, including a range of minerals, metals, energy sources, to feed heavy 
industries.  In order to satisfy this demand for heavy industrial production, China 
increasingly turned to commodity-rich countries in Latin America.
191
  Due to this 
commodity boom, the volume and price of specific minerals, energy, and agricultural 
commodities skyrocketed, and China’s demand for Latin American mineral, energy, and 
agricultural commodities surged. 
China’s interests in Latin America caught the United States by surprise in 2005, 
when former President Jiang Zemin embarked on a 13-day tour of Latin America.  
Current Chinese President, Xi Jinping, took his second trip to Latin America in July 
2014, where he attended the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) meeting in Brazil, followed by visits to Argentina, Venezuela, and Cuba where 
China maintains substantial energy-related interests.  China’s progress to develop and 
modernize by tapping into regions, such as Latin America, has become an expected due 
to its immense natural resource demand.  With a near ten percent economic growth rate, 
China has an unprecedented resource requirement.
192
  China’s population of 1.4 billion 
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entails a growing middle class, becoming primarily a consuming society, and surpassing 
China’s ability to produce the resources needed to fuel its own economy.  Although 
China prospers from a large diverse nation, bountiful of natural resources, the raw 
materials and natural resources are still not enough to sustain its populace and agriculture.  
Conversely, all countries in Latin America combined boast only half of the population in 
China: 581.5 million people.  During the last two decades, China has sustained a two-
digit rate of growth; therefore, analysts have concluded that for China to continue this 
growth, it necessitates a stable trading relationship with regions where raw materials and 
natural resources are plentiful.
193
  There is where Latin America comes in. 
 Throughout the 1500s, the Spanish Empire and other European explorers 
ransacked LAC from all their gold and silver – leading to the historical Gold Rush and 
the story of El Dorado.  More recently, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
United States continued to exploit natural resources in LAC – creating the pejorative term 
of a Banana Republic.  The LAC–China relationship could be the first time in LAC’s 
history that there is fair trade.  However, while this paper does not seek to analyze the 
financial or economic fairness of the LAC–China trade, this paper does recognize that 
LAC has historically had a significant international role on the matter of supply and 
demands of natural resources. 
 In order for China to meet their manufacturing and production demands globally, 
it must import raw materials from abroad.  Energy resources and raw material, if not 
imported into China, are not sufficient solely from China’s natural production.  China’s 
foresight of their economic and environment capabilities has allowed them to capitalize 
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on the phrase Going-Out, demonstrating their proactiveness to seize natural resources 
around the world.  Former diplomat from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jose 
Leon-Manriquez, validates China’s demand for natural resources due to China’s “need to 
imitate the technological patterns of foreign leaders, the intensive use of labor, and a 
voracious appetite for commodities and energy resources that are key propellants to 
economic takeoff.”
194
  China’s thirst to expand globally comes at a trade-off, which is 
either to deplete their own country’s raw materials, or partner with nations eager to trade 
their natural resources for China’s cash.  Resource nationalism takes over, which leaves 
China without options but to seek out countries fortunate enough to abundantly produce 
raw materials. 
 Latin America not only satisfies China’s requirement, but also enables the United 
States to continue importing products produced in China, using raw materials from LAC.  
Compared to the United States, China’s raw commodities demand is preponderant.  This 
two-way beneficial trade relationship, although nascent, has captured the attention of 
both foreign analysts and economists to analyze and predict how the United States should 
respond to this aspect of globalization.  
 
CASE STUDY:  Latin America to China’s Rescue 
 
Natural Resource Abundance in Latin America 
 
Scholars are not astonished by Latin America’s magnificent supply of natural 
resources.  On the contrary, the plethora of raw commodities has been a blessing to Latin 
America.  Indeed, LAC’s production of precious metals, sugar, rubber, grains, coffee, 
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copper, and oil have, at various periods of history, enabled certain countries some of the 
most prosperous in the world.
195
  Acknowledged in a World Bank report, “Latin America 
produced around 80 percent of the world’s silver in the 16th through 19th centuries, 
fueling the monetary systems of not only Europe, but China and India as well.  Because 
so much of the riches brought to Brazil by the discovery of gold in the late 1600s were 
spent on imports from England, some historians claim that this was instrumental in laying 
the foundation for the Industrial Revolution.”
196
  For these reasons, LAC’s ability to 
remain a rich natural resource country has been expected by the international community; 
however, China’s blossomed attraction for LAC has taken the world by surprise.  
China and LAC’s economic relationship was built on the “sheer complementarity 
of their resource endowments: China’s scarcity versus LAC’s abundance of natural 
resources.”
197
   China’s globalization and rising demand of natural resources is reshaping 
Latin America’s political economy.  This demand is viewed by academics as a “unitary 
historical process that is changing configurations of wealth and power in Latin American 
societies.”
198
  Basically, the LAC countries primarily exporting to China, are developing 
at a quicker rate than other countries.  This is concerning due to the fact that Latin 
America’s GDP is primarily generated by a minority of countries.  The following seven 
dominant countries supplying natural resource commodities make up approximately 85 
percent of regional GDP: Argentina (agricultural export commodities), Chile (copper), 
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Colombia (oil), Mexico (hydrocarbons), Peru (mining), and Venezuela (hydrocarbons).
199
  
Moreover, there are only a few LAC countries exporting natural resources to China, 
therefore, these specific countries have a competitive advantage over their neighbors and 
other countries.  Though it is conceded that an emergent gap in GDP has developed in 
Latin America, it is also still convinced that over time, additional LAC countries will 
effectively manage their natural resources to not only maintain resource nationalism but 
also to meet China’s demand and receive capital in return. 
In 2003, the commodity boom transpired, then burst in 2008, causing stock prices 
of natural resources to drastically drop.  Specifically, nickel, copper, aluminum, and 
soybeans fell respectively 55, 53, 36, and 18 percent.
200
  Nevertheless, China’s demand 
for these raw materials continued unabated, which provided Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Paraguay hard currency by exporting soy beans and soy oil.
201
  Moreover, Chile and 
Peru benefited from China’s necessity for copper, and Ecuador and Venezuela prospered 
due to their petroleum exports.  While the rest of the world suffered from the 2008 
economy crash, China provided Latin America with a reliable cash flow through trading 
natural resources.  From 2000 to 2008, LAC’s exports to China grew at an average rate of 
40.2 percent.
202
  In a testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in 2008, Senior Advisor Daniel Erikson noted 
the pace of trade between China and LAC had skyrocketed from $10 billion to over $100 
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  As China’s demand remains, this two-way beneficial relationship between 
China and Latin America will endure.  
 
Trade Agreements 
 China’s FTAs with Latin America signify the bilateral relationship that both 
countries are taking to reduce tariff costs and trade barriers.  Reducing these trade 
obstructions creates more stability within Latin America and will make it easier for other 
LAC countries to open trade agreements with China.  Currently, China has FTAs with 
Chile (2006), Peru (2009), and Costa Rica (2010), including both goods and services.
204
  
By 2020, China’s commodity import demand is expected to exceed ten percent each year.  
From 2006 to 2020, China’s demand for iron will go from 148 million tons to 380 million 
tons, copper will go from three million tons to 600 million tons, and soy from 26 million 
tons to 80 million tons.
205
  This data demonstrates that LAC governments have slighty 
shifted their dependence on the United States and are exploring promising partnerships 
with China.  
 
Chile 
 As the first LAC country to authorize a FTA with China, Chile is proving to 
neighboring nations that natural resource trading will result in increased GDP and boost 
overall well-being.  Chile and China’s diplomatic relations were established in 1970, 
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which have progressed towards a healthy economic relationship.  Ranging in a variety of 
exports to China, Chile’s resources entail agricultural products, cellulose, sea products, 
and chemicals.
206
  Chile is the largest copper exporter in the world, and China is the 





Brazil was one of the initial South American countries to embrace globalization 
and partner with China.  Brazil already supplies China with $1.7 billion in agricultural 
products, which equals eight percent of Brazil’s total agricultural exports, with soy 
constituting 90 percent of the total.”
208
  In addition to soy, Brazil is a significant 
contributor of iron ore to China.   
 
Argentina 
Moreover, Argentina’s production of soybeans and soybean oil has been a 
foundational trade commodity with China.  Through the aforementioned blend of 
investments in natural resources, China has secured a presence within Latin America.  
This manifestation is forecasted to gain momentum as China is unlikely to internally 
source enough raw materials and energy self-sufficiently. 
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Whereas China is the world’s largest producer of rare earths and steel, and the 
third largest producer of iron more, it is also the world’s largest consumer of steel and 
metals.
209
  China’s demand for these raw materials will continue to increase, to the extent 
China continues to be in the forefront of car manufacturing, appliances, railroad 
construction and naval fleet innovation.  Researchers and mining officials estimate that 
Chinese direct investment in Latin America from 2005, to 2011, was approximately $50 
billion.
210
  China’s heavy involvement with LAC’s mining commodities, specifically 
copper, is uncontested.   
Scholars estimate that by 2020, “China will be self-sufficient in only five of the 
nineteen major metal minerals.”
211
  Facing this reality, China tightened the reins on its 
resource nationalism policy.  Beginning in the 1990s, Chinese companies implemented 
their Going Out strategy in Latin America by acquiring an iron ore mine in Peru in 1993, 
called Shougang Hierro Peru, S.A. (SHP).
212
  China’s globalization in the mining 
industry was strategic, in that they deliberately engaged with developed mining 
companies in lieu of national governments.  Although relatively small, Peru is a “heavily 
mining based economy that is almost exclusively geared towards commodity export.”
213
  
Peru’s mineral exploitation accounts for one-fourth of tax revenues and six percent of 
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  Thirty-four percent of mineral investments in Peru are from China, and Peru 
represents 26 percent of China’s global mergers and acquisitions.
215
  Covering 670 square 
kilometers in Peru, the iron ore extracted with copper resource exceeds seven million tons 
annually, which is used to manufacture goods in China later exported throughout the 
world.  Shougang Corporation is one of China’s largest steel companies, where iron and 
copper is imported into China, then products, such as steel, mechanical, electrical 
products, metallurgical materials, iron mineral products, equipment and spare parts are 
manufactured and exported.
216
  China’s consumer dominance over LAC’s mining 
industry could allow for suppliers, such as Peru and Chile, to allocate generated revenue 
toward research and development innovation to more efficiently extract resources.  This 
is exactly where the United States can have an active role in encouraging these nations to 
priorities revenue to science, technology, engineering and math education programs and 
research industries.   
 
Response from the United States 
 Through official diplomacy and public avenues, China has emphasized that 
mutually beneficial ties with Latin America is a logical outcome of relations with China, 
itself a developing nation.
217
  China has embassies and consulates in 20 Latin American 
countries, including Venezuela, Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru 
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  Additionally, China has established Confucius Institutes around the 
globe, including one in Costa Rica and Ecuador, two in Argentina, Chile and Colombia, 
and three in Brazil, four in Peru, and five in Mexico.
219
  Conservative scholars insist the 
enhanced relationship between Latin America and China will inevitably mix into culture 
conformations, which could possibly lead to influences within governments.  Deputy 
Director of the Institute of Latin American studies and Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences remarked, “since Latin America entered the 21st century, democracy has been 
all the more resilient and, with the rise of the left, political dualism has been 
reinforced.”
220
  In reality, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela are structuring policies 
around anti-American principles and straying from democratic principles.  However, 
these democratic shifts are not a result of economic relations with China.  China’s 
government is not influencing Latin America with socialist or communist ideologies.  
The United States remains the largest single source of foreign direct investment into 
Latin America.  The economic presence of the United States is still huge, even with trade 
diversification.  Therefore, the United States is not threatened by China’s thirst for 
natural resources within Latin America.  Furthermore, U.S. officials have suggested that 
Chinese engagement with Latin America could lead to increased U.S.–Chinese 
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 Beginning in 2005, China’s increasing linkages and intentions in Latin America 
caused growing concerns within the U.S. Congress.  House and Senate sub-committees 
held hearings on China’s role in Latin America, which the U.S. China Economic and 
Security Review Commission held hearings on China’s global expansion, including the 
Western Hemisphere.
222
  Those who assert that China’s booming presence in Latin 
America could become a threat to the United States insist that the United States must be 
watchful of China’s actions in the hemisphere.  These observers consider that by 
“presenting an alternative political and economic model – rapid economic growth and 
modernization alongside political authoritarianism – China undermines the U.S. agenda 
to advance political reform, human rights and free trade in the region.”
223
  According to 
this view, the Chinese model could help strengthen anti-democratic and anti-U.S. 
political leaders and actors in some countries, such as Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela.  Second, according to analysts, “China’s regional presence ultimately could 
have significant strategic implications for the United States in the event of a possible 
military conflict with infrastructure in the region to disrupt and distract the United States 
in the hemisphere.”
224
  According to this view, China’s increased presence in the region 
could also allow for new opportunities to collect intelligence data against U.S. military 
operations in the region.  Third, others argue that China is trading more with Latin 
America, thus decreasing the share of U.S. trade.  However, as previously stated, the 
United States continues as the largest single source of foreign direct investment into Latin 
America, therefore, U.S. economic interests remain unthreatened.      
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 Conversely, others maintain that China’s presence in the region is minimal, and 
although it is growing, the United States will continue to be Latin America’s long-term 
economic partner of preference.  Additionally, before the House Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs Rogelio Pardo-Maurer testified that there was no “evidence that 
Chinese military activities in the Western Hemisphere, including arm sales, pose a direct 
conventional threat to the United States.”
225
  Nevertheless, both sides concur that the 
United States needs to maintain vigilance and secure intelligence of China’s actions in 
the region.  
Indeed, the health of Latin America’s natural resources is as important for the 
United States as it is for China.  However, where China and the United States differ is 
due to inherent geography.  The United States should enhance trade with LAC, in order 
to secure more job security in Latin America.  The United States and Latin America share 
the Western Hemisphere and have other mutual interests besides economic trade alone.  
Specifically, the United States must ensure that security, immigration and trade do not 
threaten U.S. national interests.  The majority of Latin America has achieved a consensus 
about democracy, free markets and protecting the security of a democratic state, and the 
U.S. interest is to ensure that China respects this larger consensus.  
 According to the Pew Research Center study titled America’s Global Image 
Remains More Positive than China’s, Latin America, Bolivia, Argentina and Venezuela 
favor China, rather than the United States.
226
  Although these studies may cause U.S. 
economists to fear that future trade with Latin America may suffer as projects and 
                                                          
225
 Ibid. p28. 
226
 Pew Research Center. “America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s: But Many See 
China Becoming World’s Leading Power.” July 18, 2013. p4.  
86 
 
investments are sourced through China versus the United States, this data merely shows 
China and LAC’s relationship is positively evolving.  The United States has no reason to 
be alarmed of LAC’s trendy favorability to China.  
 China’s profound interest in LAC’s natural resources is positive for both Latin 
America and the United States.  Assuming LAC governments stray from corruption, 
increased GDP will lead towards improved education systems and overall healthier 
countries.  China is providing revenue and employment for Latin Americans, which 
provides families resources rather than having to depend on transnational organized 
crime, specifically drug trafficking.  As China expounds on its economic involvement 
with Latin America, the potential for transnational crimes reduction strengthens.  
Although exports from LAC to China are predominantly dominated by few 
countries, such as Chile, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Costa Rica, the initial 
trade barriers have reduced for countries to embark on trading with China.  Historically, 
the countries that comprise Latin America aim for the advancement of the region as a 
whole.  Indeed, the Western Hemisphere, in its entirety, prospers when revenue increases, 
unemployment shrinks, poverty drops and quality of living is enhanced. 
At one end of the spectrum is optimism that China constitutes a new and 
alternative driver of trade and investment for developing countries.  The Chinese 
government recognizes the China–Latin America economic relationship is a win-win for 
both countries; however, certain U.S. observers debate this relationship as a new form of 
dependency.  They argue the China–Latin America economic relationship will have 
short-term benefits for both sides, but over the long term Latin America could become 
dependent on China’s commodity hunger.  Latin America has been struggling to move 
87 
 
away from the natural resource provider to rapidly industrializing countries in North 
America and Europe during the late nineteenth and early 19th century.
227
  On the other 
end of the spectrum, the United States identifies China’s rapid industrialization as a direct 
result from the United States and other developed nation’s economies.  Therefore, if the 
United States continues to expand trade and economic relations with China, then Latin 
America will continue to thrive in exporting natural resources to China. 
On the human rights front, scholars warn that China’s lack of human rights and 
environmental restrictions may bleed over into Latin America; yet, others believe that 
cultural divide will keep Latin America and China’s relationship strictly commercial.
228
  
Within Latin America, state and political institutions are fluctuating, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are directing focus in LAC, and environmental organizations are 
lobbying for natural resource policy changes.  Should LAC’s natural resource policies 
become more structured and regulated, LAC may risk China redirecting their economic 
agenda with less controlled countries.  However, scenarios such as these can only be 
speculated against, as China and Latin America’s relationship has only started to evolve 
in recent years.  
In addition to promoting China’s pursuit towards advancing natural resource 
capabilities, the United States should creative incentives for Latin America to focus more 
attention on their education programs and universities.  Based on public data sources and 
academics, Latin America does not spend adequately on their education programs.  For 
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comparison, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Israel allocate approximately 
seven percent of their annual gross national product into education.  Former Soviet-bloc 
countries invest around five percent.  However, Mexico spends 4.4 percent; Chile, 4.2 
percent; Argentina, 4 percent; Peru 3.3 percent; Colombia, 2.5 percent; and Guatemala, 
1.7 percent.
229
  Therefore, the United States should promote economic development 
based on other industries, rather than solely natural resources.  In past centuries, countries 
rich in natural resources had an advantage, however, today some argue it is a 
disadvantage due to dependency.  For example, the Soviet Union, with the world’s riches 
supplies of natural resources, collapsed.  Neither South Africa, with its diamonds, nor 
Nigeria, Venezuela, and Mexico with their oil, have managed to eradicate poverty.  Most 
of the aforementioned countries are more poor today than they were 20 years prior.  Yet, 
nations with limited natural resources, such as Luxemburg, Ireland, Liechtenstein, 




Overall, Latin America’s leadership is closely aligned to leadership within the 
United States.  Both maintain cultural similarities and democratic policies.  Although 
China and Latin America’s relationship is currently economic, China is pouring 
investment opportunities into LAC countries, which will inevitably increase 
infrastructure projects and attract the Chinese tourism and business industries.  For 
example, in 1992, when Shougang Corporation established the first mining privatization 
in Peru, China brought in 350 Chinese staff, fired local employees, and assumed control 
of the community’s water services, which created conflicts with labor unions and local 
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  In present times, the working relationship between China and LAC is 
less invasive than in the 1990s, where political and economic leaders strive for both 
countries involved to benefit, including labor unions and employment in LAC.  Learning 
from mistakes, the aforementioned example of a Chinese state-owned enterprise invested 
in environmental clean-up projects and cultivated relationships with the LAC 
governments.  Furthermore, processes have been established where compensation is 
offered to local residents who voluntarily relocate, so Chinese companies can initiate 
mining constructions and operations.
232
   
 
Conclusion 
 Only two decades ago, China and Latin America’s economic relationship was 
unprecedented.  China now serves an alternative model of economic development and 
international diplomacy.  Foreign direct investment from China was approximately $12 
million in 2005 and rose to $86 million by 2012.
233
   Former Chinese Vice President Xi 
Jinping delivered a keynote speech regarding China’s bilateral ties with Latin America 
saying, “cooperation between China and Latin America has reached an unprecedented 
level…bilateral trade reached 143.39 billion U.S. dollars in 2008, 39.7 percent up from 
the previous year and ten times that of 2000.”
234
  Mr. Jinping went on to say, “China is 
ready to work with Latin American nations to strengthen coordination and boost 
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confidence so as to contribute to the stable growth of the global economy.”
235
  In fact, the 
Chinese press argued that China’s strong demand for Latin American commodities 
played a key role in minimizing the negative effects of the global financial crisis and 
providing a strong engine driving a swift regional recovery.
236
   
China appears to understand that the United States is sensitive to involvement in 
its neighborhood and has thus far been careful not to provoke the United States.  This 
paper outlines China’s natural resource approach in the region and focusing on trade and 
investment opportunities that help contribute to both China and Latin America’s 
economic development.  Even Chinese relations with Venezuela are focused on oil 
resources rather than ideological connections. 
China has and will continue to be transparent about their economic intentions with 
Latin America.  In reality, China has been efficient in proactively expanding their 
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 This thesis has identified the peremptory need for the United States to rebalance 
priorities and foster stronger political, economic, and military relations with neighboring 
countries in the Western Hemisphere.  Specifically, the U.S. administration should foster 
enhanced levels of security coordination and cooperation among nations in Latin 
America, pay heightened attention in disrupting the movement of criminals and 
contraband to and within Central America, and support the development of strong, 
capable, and accountable regional governments.  It is in the United States’ best interests 
to make a greater effort to contribute to Latin America’s economic development and 
foster regional security that would help keep terrorists out of the Western Hemisphere.  
As former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated during a State Department ceremony in 
September 2003, “there is no region in the world more important to the people of the 
United States than this hemisphere,” referring to Latin America.
237
  From a trade, 
immigration, drug trafficking, environmental, and oil-producing perspective, no region in 
the world has a greater impact than Latin America on a day-to-day life in the United 
States.  
 Latin America is in constant change.  From dictatorships and civil wars in the 
past, to a more recent economic boom in Brazil and Panama, and Venezuela’s and 
Mexico’s billions of dollars in profits from oil and drugs, respectively, to China’s trillions 
of dollars in investments in the region, the United States faces a complex multilayer 
security problem: immigration, transnational crime, and terrorism.  Transnational 
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organized crime directly impacts U.S. national security, whether trafficking illegal drugs 
or smuggling unauthorized people across U.S. borders.  This crime inevitably breeds 
violence, corruption, and havoc.  Every year, millions of Latin Americans are escaping 
poverty.  Criminalized states have emerged in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.  
Russia has stepped up strategic partnerships with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.  The 
United States must increase regional security efforts and confront a growing number of 
regional adversaries, such as Venezuela and Ecuador, to insure violence does not 
continue in this upward trajectory, which has severely impacted, Central America, a few 
countries in South America, and islands in the Caribbean, including the U.S. territory 
Puerto Rico. 
 Notwithstanding its economic and transnational crime challenges, democracy 
remains the prominent form of government practiced in the region.  Latin America 
embodies more consolidated democracies, continues to enhance social protection policies 
and is building stronger integrated economies.  Therefore, the United States should 
increase support for Latin America to keep progressing and to make this progress 
sustainable in a volatile global environment, full of challenges and uncertainties.  
 Each chapter focused on at least one of the following critical issues: increased 
transnational organized crime – emerging trade with China – engagements with anti-
American leaders – Central and South America impacts for the United States through 
political, economical, and military means.  Each of the aforementioned issues assessed 
the United States–Latin America relationship through examining regional stability. 
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 Chapter one demonstrated that a small rogue state could impact the regional 
hegemony.  The case study of Venezuela, under former President Chavez, showed the 
way in which his leadership intended to harm U.S. interests.  Although not a direct 
national security threat to the United States, Venezuela showed its capability to impact 
the United States’ democratic, economic, and regional stability interests.   
The United States must continue to support democracies in Latin America, and 
seek to encourage reforms of states that develop anti-democratic ideologies and policies. 
Chavez’s policies and posturing caused U.S. policy-makers to question his regard for 
democratic governance.  Although former President Chavez influenced the region, and 
current President Maduro continues to represent socialist ideologies, the United States 
must remain optimistic that Latin America, as a whole, will ultimately reject the 
government of Venezuela’s rhetoric.  Although the national security threats Chavez 
posed to the United States were hypothetical and limited, he laid the foundation and 
framework for those eager and able to threaten U.S. security interests. 
Chapter two examined the efficacy of U.S. military missions in the key sub-region 
of Central America.  Studying the U.S.–Central America relationship, this chapter 
identified the importance of developing a regional security strategy.  After analyzing 
DOD operations in Honduras, findings determined the efficient use of resources, 
especially during an era of austerity budgets for the United States, must be revaluated.  
Counter transnational organized crime efforts can continue to remain aligned with 
counterterrorism objectives without being physically based in Honduras.  The United 
States can still maintain vigilance in monitoring and guarding against an opportunistic or 
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growing nexus between foreign terrorist organizations and transnational organized 
criminal without a costly and physical U.S. military presence in Honduras.  
Finally, the third chapter investigates China’s recent obsession with Latin 
America’s natural resources.  China’s aggressive achievements towards becoming a 
developed nation by expanding into Latin America’s doorstep should prompt the United 
States to enhance trade with LAC.  Additionally, the United States must promote more 
than simply Latin America’s economic develop of natural resources.  The United States 
should provide incentives for Latin America to invest more on education, specifically 
within engineering, physics, and mathematics.  The United States and Latin America 
share the Western Hemisphere and have other mutual interests besides economic trade 
alone.  Moreover, the United States must ensure that security, immigration and trade do 
not threaten U.S. national security interests.  
Each chapter discussed how Latin America’s future affects U.S. security interests 
towards developing a stronger economy, maintaining regional security, and sustaining 
democratic policies.  Latin American countries are largely at peace with one another and 
with the United States; therefore, conventional military threats from the region remain 
low.  However, nations throughout the hemisphere are contending with asymmetric 
threats to national and international security.  Latin America must create a culture of 
evaluation that compels individuals to do better, from high school and university 
students, to parents and teachers, to business and other professionals.  Latin American 
governments and leadership should encourage an atmosphere of competitiveness, not 
only the education system, but in all departments.   
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Chapter one showed a positive and open relationship between Venezuela and the 
United States would have mutually benefited both countries; however, Venezuela’s 
leadership chose to attack, verbally and through anti-American ideologies, the United 
States.  Therefore, the United States should remain watchful for the potential impact of 
activities of violent extremist organizations and implications of the activities of nations, 
such as Iran, within the region.  Chapter two identified that Honduras continues illegal 
trafficking and transnational organized crime, which directly results in an instable Central 
America.  Chapter three explored China’s sought interests in Latin America’s natural 
resources.  The findings delivered optimism by highlighting China, a developing nation, 
recognized Latin America’s potential by taking risk and opening new economic 
relationships.  Moreoever, LAC to increase foreign relationships by developing their 
education culture, which would attract foreign investors, not only for natural resources, 
but in research and development and other industries.  In the end, Latin America remains 
and will remain an area of critical interest.   
When it comes to issues affecting the United States – whether immigration, trade, 
the environment or energy – no region in the world has a bigger impact on the United 
States than Latin America.  Around 12 million undocumented workers live in the United 
States, with almost four out of five being Latin Americans.
238
  In order to create more 
jobs, reduce crime, increase the economy, and promote a better quality of living in Latin 
America, the United States must increase support.  Specifically, Latin America must 
draw more foreign investment and invest more in education, science, and technology.  
Closer U.S.-Latin American ties would be in the interests of all.  
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Financial Management Strategic Budgeting Event Coordination 





San Juan, Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico                        July 2014 – Present  
Instructor, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 
 Recruits, trains, motivates and counsels highly-qualified young men and women as prospective 
Air Force officers  
 Serves as unit Education Officer for 150 students; advises unit instructors on course curricula and 
oversaw all training 
 Oversees the institution of all course revisions, test preparation, and improvement of student 
instructional curricula 
 Instructs courses on U.S. National Security, Air Force History and Doctrine, and Leadership 
Studies; integrates both written and verbal communication skills 
 
Washington, D.C.: Pentagon                         April 2013 – June 2014 
Chief, Military Workforce Management, Secretary of the Air Force Financial Management 
 Advised Financial Management career field manager and Secretary of the Air Force Financial 
Management (SAF/FM) on officer education and training for 763 officers. 
 Managed SAF/FM on military personnel for 93members. 
 Assisted the Director of Workforce Management in integration and communication of key officer 
workforce management issues. 
 Led SAF/FM interface with senior Financial Management and Air Force Personnel Center on all 
processes and programs impacting SAF/FM personnel. 
 
Honduras: Soto Cano Air Base            October 2012 - April 2013 
Director of Resource Management and Financial Operations, Joint Task Force - Bravo 
 Executed $350K for medical missions in Guatemala, Panama and Belize; 5,324 patients were 
treated. 
 Secures Latin American Official Representation of Funds; fosters regional security between 
United States and 70 Honduran leaders in four events. 
 Advocated to Congress for $3.4M counter transnational crime funding to meet SOUTHCOM’s 
number one requirement. 
 Extended diplomacy by conducting and supporting joint operations, actions, and activities 
throughout Central America maintaining a forward presence in order to enhance regional 
security, stability, and cooperation. 






Washington, D.C.: Pentagon                       November 2011 - October 2012 
Budget Analyst, Financial Management and Comptroller, Air Force Reserves 
 Managed and executed Air Force Reserves’ Staff funds.  Appropriation manager for operations 
and maintenance (O&M), reserve pay account (RPA), and military construction (MILCON) funds 
totaling $5.3B. 
 Developed budget estimates, supplemental requests and omnibus reprogramming. 
 Responded to Congressional inquiries to include formal requests from Congressional staffers and 
formal information requests for inclusion in the Congressional Record. 
 Interpreted and evaluated Congressional intent as contained in the language of Public Law and 
Congressional reports with input and review. 
 
 
Joint Base Andrews, Maryland: Andrews Air Force Base         November 2010 - November 2011 
Deputy Comptroller, 11th Comptroller Squadron 
 Justified and executed an annual Air Force base operation and maintenance budget in excess of 
$200M. 
 Provided financial services to over 17,000 DoD members in 26 organizations throughout the 
National Capital Region and world.  Ensured personnel correct payment and entitlements. 
 Provided oversight and guidance on appropriated and non-appropriated funding in according with 
DoD and Headquarters Air Force directives. 
 
Muscat, Oman: U.S. Embassy        October 2009 - October 2010 
Comptroller, Executive Coordinating Agency, Air Force Central Command 
 Managed $4.3M budget supporting War Reserve Material program at eight sites in Bahrain, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait.  Sustained $5.2B in DoD assets and led all 
logistics for first-ever Bahrain WRM conference.  Continued international relations between the 
U.S. and Oman. 
 Sole liaison between British Embassy Defense Attaché and U.S. government for Acquisition 
Cross Service Agreements.  Provided cost estimates for use of U.S. military assets and 
equipment.  Collected reimbursements post training exercises. 
 Sole liaison with Royal Oman Air Force Treasury department.  Approved invoices and validated 
costs before obligating U.S. funds for daily operations at three in-country military bases. 
 Managed all pay and personnel issues for 24 person unit.  Coordinated travel, authorized 
expenditures, and related outlays for unit operations. 
 
Little Rock, Arkansas: Little Rock Air Force Base                 January 2006 - October 2009 
Budget Analyst, Deputy Flight Commander, Comptroller Squadron 
 Executed $121M over two-year’s budget by interpreting headquarters’ regulations.  Financial 
advisor to senior leadership.  Balanced programs and identified funding trends to determine 
program priorities.     
 Ensured proper implementation of Air Force policy for budget execution, developed guidance 
and projections for future funding requirements. 
 Provided full range of management services to over 6,000 military and civilian personnel and 










Johns Hopkins University, Zanvyl Kriger School of Arts & Sciences     
Graduated December 2014  
Washington, D.C. 
Masters of Arts in Global Security Studies 
 
DeVry University, Keller Graduate School of Management                     
Graduated August 2008 
Masters in Business Administration   
 
Wright State University                  
Graduated August 2005 
Dayton, Ohio                      
Bachelor of Science in Business. Major: Finance. 
Activities: Air Force R.O.T.C. 
 
Cedarville University                                              
August 2001 - May 2003 
Cedarville, Ohio 
Area of Concentration: Finance. 





Awards and Honors 
 
 Andrews Air Force Base Company Grade Officer of the Quarter:  April-June 2011. 
 Muscat Employee Association:  Treasurer 2010, U.S. Embassy-Muscat, Oman. 
 Little Rock AFB Company Grade Officer Council (CGOC):  Treasurer 2008; President 2009. 
 Little Rock AFB Wing Staff Company Grade Officer of the Year:  2008. 
Personal 
 D.C. Nations Triathlon, 2013, 2011 / ING Miami Half-Marathon, 2012 / D.C. National Half-
Marathon, 2011 / Little Rock Half-Marathon, 2009 / Marine Corps Marathon, 2007 
